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 “IMPORTING” RESTRICTIONS FROM ONE 
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE PROVISION 
TO ANOTHER: THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE 
CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 





[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on 
context. 
— King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital
1
 
No statute is an island unto itself. 




Until 1975, the federal law of evidence was largely common law in form. 
However, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect.
3
 The current, 
restyled version of Federal Rule of Evidence 402 reads: 
  
                                                                                                             
 * Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis 
School of Law; former chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools. 
 1. 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991). 
 2. 859 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Brune, 767 F.3d 
1009, 1022 (10th Cir. 2014)). 
 3. RONALD L. CARLSON, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, JULIE SEAMAN & ERICA BEECHER-
MONAS, EVIDENCE: TEACHING MATERIALS FOR AN AGE OF SCIENCE AND STATUTES 15 (8th ed. 
2018).  
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 Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following 
provides otherwise: 
$ the United States Constitution; 
$ a federal statute; 
$ these rules; or 
$ other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.4 
Rule 101(b)(5) states that a “‘rule prescribed by the Supreme Court’ 
means a rule adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory authority,”
5
 
such as the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure. Conspicuously absent 
from the list in Rule 402 is any mention of case or decisional law. That 
omission implies that federal courts no longer possess the common-law 
authority to create or enforce uncodified exclusionary rules. The Congress 
that enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence was a legislature jealous of its 
constitutional prerogatives, in part because it had recently battled Richard 
Nixon over claims of executive privilege in federal court during the 
Watergate investigation.
6
 Three years after the enactment of the rules, the 
late Professor Edward Cleary, the Reporter for the Advisory Committee 
which drafted the rules, wrote: “In principle, under the Federal Rules no 
common law of evidence remains.”
7
 On two occasions, the United States 
Supreme Court has approvingly quoted that very passage.
8
 
Most articles in the Federal Rules of Evidence contain several 
provisions. For example, Article VI lists multiple impeachment techniques.
9
 
                                                                                                             
 4. FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 5. Id. 105(b)(5). 
 6. 26 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5661, at 465–67 (1992); 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW 
WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 4.2.2.a, at 247 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE]. 
 7. Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. 
REV. 908, 915 (1978). 
 8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993); United States v. 
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51–52 (1984); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of 
Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REV. LITIG. 129, 129 (1987) (“In each case 
documented in his article, Professor Rossi pointed to express language in the Rules’ text or 
legislative history which manifested an intent to abolish a restrictive, common-law 
evidentiary rule.”) (citing Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution, LITIG., Winter 1983, at 13, 
13–19) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402].  
 9. FED. R. EVID. 608 (character for untruthfulness); id. 609 (prior conviction); id. 610 
(religious beliefs); id. 613 (prior inconsistent statements). 
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Article VII includes Rule 703, which recognizes several different sources of 
information that an expert may rely on as a factual basis for an opinion.
10
 
For its part, Article VIII contains a large number of hearsay exemptions and 
exceptions.
11
 In Article IX, Rule 901(b) illustrates adequate authentication 
foundations,
12
 while Rule 902 catalogues a number of techniques for 
rendering an exhibit self-authenticating.
13
 Finally, Article X, which governs 
the Best Evidence Rule, lists a number of excuses for nonproduction—that 
is, acceptable explanations for the proponent’s failure to produce an 
original writing at trial.
14
 
These evidentiary doctrines are set out in physically separate 
provisions—suggesting that the drafters intended for them to operate 
independently,
15
 functioning as distinct theories of admissibility. Thus, even 
if the proponent could not produce a conviction to impeach a witness under 
Rule 609,
16
 the proponent might be able to inquire into that witness’s 
untruthful act under Rule 608(b).
17
 Likewise, if the proponent could not 
introduce an item of evidence as an official record over a hearsay objection 
under Rule 803(8),
18
 the proponent might be able to persuade a judge to 
admit the item as a business entry under Rule 803(6).
19
 Similarly, although 
the proponent might be unable to find a lay acquaintance to authenticate a 
writing under Rule 901(b)(2),
20
 the proponent could call a forensic 
examiner to authenticate the document under Rule 901(b)(3).
21
 At first 
blush, each provision seems to be a stand-alone doctrine, and the provisions 
appear capable of serving as alternative theories of admissibility. 
In a few cases, though, some courts have refused to treat the provisions 
as independent. As Part I demonstrates, all of these cases deal with a 
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. 703 (any fact personally observed or brought to the expert’s attention if it is the 
reasonable practice in the expert’s field to rely on reports from such sources). 
 11. Id. 801(d) (exemptions for a party-opponent’s statements and a testifying witness’s 
prior statements); id. 803 (exceptions that do not require proof of the declarant’s 
unavailability at trial); id. 804 (exceptions that require proof of the declarant’s unavailability 
at trial); id. 807 (the residual or catchall exception).  
 12. Id. 901(b). 
 13. Id. 902 (noting that self-authenticating items “require no extrinsic evidence of 
authenticity in order to be admitted”).  
 14. Id. 1004–07.  
 15. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 16. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 17. Id. 608(b). 
 18. Id. 803(8). 
 19. Id. 803(6). 
 20. Id. 901(b)(2). 
 21. Id. 901(b)(3). 
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variation of the same basic fact situation: The court analyzes two distinct 
provisions in the same article of the Federal Rules of Evidence; one 
provision expressly imposes a restriction on the introduction of evidence 
under that provision; the second provision does not contain that restriction; 
and the text of the first provision does not purport to extend the restriction 
to the second provision. Yet, in these cases, the court ultimately decides to 
apply the restriction stated in the first provision to the second provision and, 
on that basis, excludes the proffered evidence. 
This Article concedes the importance of context in the process of 
statutory construction. As the Supreme Court commented in King v. St. 
Vincent’s Hospital, context—the other parts of the same statutory scheme—
can play a central role in statutory interpretation.
22
 Yet, this Article argues 
that in the fact situation discussed in the preceding paragraph, contextual 
interpretation ordinarily does not provide an adequate justification for 
“importing” a restriction from one Federal Rule of Evidence provision into 
another. In the typical case, such a judicial importation amounts to a 
usurpation of legislative authority. More specifically, this Article contends 
that the courts may only import a restriction from another provision if the 
accompanying extrinsic legislative history very clearly manifests a 
legislative intention not merely to impose a restriction under the first 
provision but, more importantly, to absolutely bar the admission of a 
particular type of evidence under any theory. 
The Article develops this thesis in three steps. Part I is descriptive and 
reviews three lines of authority in which the courts have imported 
restrictions from one Federal Rule provision to another: first, from Rule 609 
to Rule 608(b); second, in which the courts have limited the scope of Rule 
807 (the residual hearsay exception) in light of express restrictions codified 
in Rules 803 and 804; and third, from Rule 803(8) to Rule 803(6). In each 
of these cases, courts treated the provision setting out the imported 
restrictions as context for the second provision and, for that reason, read the 
restriction into the second provision. 
Part II presents an overview of the general contemporary framework for 
statutory construction. Initially, Section II.A describes the modern textualist 
approach to statutory construction, which cautions against routinely 
consulting extrinsic legislative history and ascribing significant weight to 
such history. The approach emphasizes that only the statutory language has 
                                                                                                             
 22. 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (“[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, 
depends on context.”) (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 26 
(1988)).  
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the force of law and that extrinsic legislative history is vulnerable to 
manipulation by special interest groups. The ascendance of textualism has 
simultaneously decreased the importance of extrinsic legislative history and 
increased the importance of context. Like the specific text being construed, 
the context—other parts of the same legislative scheme—has the formal 
status of law. In some statutory construction texts, contextual interpretation 
is perfectly legitimate. For example, the contents of one provision can help 
clarify the meaning of an ambiguous word or phrase in another provision. 
Furthermore, context can be dispositive of the construction of one provision 
if a certain interpretation of that provision would render another provision 
nugatory. But context alone does not warrant transferring or importing 
restrictions from one provision in a statutory scheme into another. The 
bottom line is that the importation is justifiable only if the extrinsic history 
contains an extraordinarily strong showing of a certain type of legislative 
intent—namely, an intent to insert the restriction into the other provision. 
After describing the general textualist approach to statutory construction, 
Section II.B proposes adapting that framework to the recurring fact pattern 
from Part I—specifically, situations in which the opponent urges the court 
to enforce a restriction stated in one provision of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in the course of applying another Federal Rules provision. Part II 
illustrates situations in which a court may legitimately import the restriction 
into the second provision to either clarify the second provision or prevent 
the nullification of the first provision. However, absent such situations, 
Section II.B argues that a court may legitimately import a restriction only if 
the extrinsic legislative history powerfully manifests an intent to bar 
completely the admission of a type of evidence mentioned in the first 
provision—not merely to impose a restriction on the admissibility of such 
evidence under that provision. 
Part III critically evaluates contextual interpretation and revisits the three 
lines of authority discussed in Part I. It critiques those lines of authority by 
applying the test proposed in Section II.B and concludes that only one is 
defensible. The other two lines of authority are flawed—one because the 
legislative history does not manifest the right type of intent, and the other 
because the extrinsic history is conflicted and falls short of qualifying as an 
extraordinarily clear showing of legislative intent. 
The Article concludes by cautioning against the indiscriminate use of 
contextual interpretation—either as an approach to the construction of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence or more broadly. As Judge Calabresi famously 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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remarked, we are living in the age of statutes
23
—an era in which statutes 
have supplanted cases as the primary source of American law. To be sure, 
context has a useful role to play in the interpretation of comprehensive 
statutory schemes. However, importing restrictions from one statutory 
provision into another provision—absent an exceptionally powerful 
showing of a legislative intent to extend the restriction in the extrinsic 
history—amounts to an unconstitutional judicial amendment of the second 
provision. As Part II acknowledges, contextual interpretation has numerous, 
legitimate applications. But under the Federal Rules of Evidence, context, 
more often than not, does not justify importation.  
I. A Description of Three Lines of Cases Relying on Contextual 
Interpretation to Justify Importing Restrictions from One Provision of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence into Another Provision 
 A. Importing Restrictions Under Federal Rule of Evidence 609 into Rule 
608(b) 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 governs the use of a witness’s prior 
convictions to impeach that witness’s credibility.
24
 Both the title and text of 
Rule 609(a) expressly refer to a “conviction.” When the witness’s prior 
conviction qualifies as a felony offense under Rule 609(a)(1), or involves “a 
dishonest act or false statement” under Rule 609(a)(2), the opposing 
attorney may cross-examine the witness about the conviction.
25
 However, it 
is well-settled that when the opponent relies on Rule 609(a) as the method 
of impeachment, the scope of the opponent’s inquiry is limited. While the 
opponent may question the witness about the fact of the conviction, the 
name of the underlying crime, and the sentence,
26
 the opponent may not 
inquire about other damaging details or “facts underlying the prior 
conviction.”
27
 Those details are not “fair game” under Rule 609.
28
 
Compare another impeachment statute. Rule 608(b) allows the cross-
examiner to question “specific instances of a witness’s conduct” “if they are 
                                                                                                             
 23. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(1982). 
 24. FED. R. EVID. 609.  
 25. Id. 609(a)(1), (2). 
 26. United States v. Albers, 93 F.3d 1469, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (D.N.M. 2018).  
 27. Albers, 93 F.3d at 1480. 
 28. See id. (“However, the defendant was entitled to the protection of the rule that only 
the prior conviction, its general nature, and punishment of felony range were fair game for 
testing the defendant’s credibility.”). 
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probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the 
witness.”
29
 Note the differences between Rule 609 and Rule 608(b). While 
the text of Rule 609 explicitly refers to a “conviction,” that noun does not 
appear in Rule 608(b). Moreover, the text of Rule 608(b) neither requires 
the opponent to show that the untruthful act has resulted in a conviction nor 
indicates whether the opponent may resort to Rule 608(b) when the act in 
question has resulted in a conviction. Hence, if courts were to treat the 
provisions independently, when a conviction qualifies under Rule 609 but 
the underlying act reflects unfavorably on the witness’s character for 
untruthfulness, the opponent could presumably do the following: (1) under 
Rule 609, question the witness about the fact of a conviction, the name of 
the underlying offense, and the sentence; and (2) under Rule 608(b), inquire 
further about the specific details that suggest the witness’s character trait or 
propensity for untruthfulness. 
The rub is that there is a line of cases holding that when the witness has 
been convicted for the untruthful act, the applicability of Rule 609 
precludes the opponent from also invoking Rule 608(b)
30
 and questioning 
about the details that reflect adversely on the witness’s character for 
truthfulness under Rule 609.
31
 In other words, these courts limit the scope 
of Rule 608(b) to “specific instances of [untruthful] conduct not resulting in 
conviction . . . .”
32
 They do so despite the fact that the words, “not resulting 
in a conviction,” do not appear in the text of Rule 608(b). These courts have 
treated Rule 609 as essential context for construing Rule 608(b), looked to 
the restrictions under Rule 609, and (to a degree) imported them into Rule 
608(b). Even if the nature of the underlying act would otherwise entitle the 
cross-examiner to inquire when the witness has been convicted under Rule 
608(b), the Rule 609 restrictions control. According to this line of cases, 
Rules 608(b) and 609 do not represent alternative theories of admissibility 
that, given the right facts, can both come into play during a witness’s cross-
examination. The upshot of this view is that the two rules are considered 
mutually exclusive: Rule 609 applies when the witness has been convicted, 
                                                                                                             
 29. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). 
 30. DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d at 1235 (“The United States Courts of Appeal disagree 
regarding whether introducing evidence of a witness’ criminal conviction under rule 609 
precludes rule 608(b) inquiry, on cross examination, regarding the specific instance of 
conduct that produced the conviction if that conduct is probative of the witness’ character for 
truthfulness.”).  
 31. See Albers, 93 F.3d at 1480. 
 32. United States v. Morales-Quinones, 812 F.2d 604, 613 (10th Cir. 1987).  
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and Rule 608(b) applies only when the witness’s untruthful act has not 
resulted in a conviction. 
B. Importing Restrictions from Rules 803 and 804 into Rule 807 
When the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect in 1975, two provisions 
contained residual or “catchall” hearsay exceptions. Rule 803, which 
governs exceptions which do not require a showing of the declarant’s 
availability at trial, concluded with a residual exception.
33
 Likewise, Rule 
804, which governs exceptions that require a showing of the declarant’s 
unavailability at trial, also ended with a residual exception.
34
 Eventually, 
however, the two exceptions were merged into a single provision, now 
designated Rule 807.
35
 As restyled in 2011, Rule 807(a) reads as follows: 
 (a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay 
statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the 
statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in 
Rule 803 or 804: 
 (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness; 
 (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;  
 (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered 
than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts; and 
 (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and 
the interests of justice.
36
 
Although the text of the rule affirmatively requires that the proffered 
evidence have “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are 
“equivalent” to hearsay admitted under Rule 803 or 804, Rule 807 says 
nothing about the significance of whether the evidence fails to qualify 
under the specific hearsay exceptions found in Rules 803 or 804.
37
 Despite 
this silence, a number of courts have adopted the so-called “near miss” 
                                                                                                             
 33. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment (“[T]he committee 
has adopted residual exceptions for rules 803 and 804(b) . . . .”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2










 fit into a specific Rule 803 or 804 exception but “narrowly 
fail[ed]”
41
 to satisfy that exception’s restrictions, the item was automatically 
inadmissible. To a degree, the “near miss” doctrine read the restrictions of 
the pertinent Rule 803 or 804 exception into Rule 807. 
The courts that adopted this view cited two reasons for embracing the 
doctrine. First, if the courts did apply the “near miss” doctrine, it would be 
too easy for proponents to circumvent the specific restrictions that the 
                                                                                                             
 38. See, e.g., United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1504 (D.N.J. 1987), aff’d, 857 
F.2d 1467 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[N]either the Advisory Committee nor the Senate Judiciary 
Committee intended that the residual exceptions be used to qualify for admission evidence 
which is of a type covered by a specific exception, but which narrowly fails to meet the 
standards of the specific rule.”) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 
505 F. Supp. 1190, 1263–64 (E.D. Pa. 1980)); see also Creamer v. Gen. Teamsters Local 
Union 326, 560 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Del. 1983) (“[W]here there is a specific hearsay 
exception applicable to a clearly defined category of evidence such as former testimony, but 
the evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of the specific exception, the evidence should 
not be admitted under the residual exception.”) (citing Zenith Radio, 505 F. Supp. at 1263–
64). 
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the new amendment to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 807 mentions that some courts have “consider[ed] whether the statement is a ‘near 
miss’ of one of the Rule 803 or 804 exceptions.” FED. R. EVID. 807 advisory committee’s 
notes to 2019 amendment. As amended, Rule 807 no longer includes a reference to 
“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Rather, amended Rule 807 
instructs the judge to determine whether “the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees 
of trustworthiness.” FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1) (effective Dec. 1, 2019). The Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, submitted to the Supreme Court, states: 
[T]he Committee addressed a dispute in the courts about whether the residual 
exception could be used when the hearsay is a “near-miss” of a standard 
exception. A change to the text and Committee Note as issued for public 
comment provides that a statement that nearly misses a standard exception can 
be admissible under Rule 807 so long as the court finds that there are sufficient 
guarantees of trustworthiness. 
Memorandum from the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules to the Comm. on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (May 14, 2018), in Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of Practice 
& Procedure, June 2018 Meeting Materials 397, 400 (June 12, 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ev_report_1.pdf. The Report thus makes it clear 
that it is not fatal to the admissibility of a statement that it is a “near-miss” to an enumerated, 
standard exception. 
 39. 7 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 807.1, at 831–36 (7th 
ed. 2012). 
 40. 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:141, 
at 281 (3d ed. 2007).  
 41. GRAHAM, supra note 39, at 831–36. 
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drafters had included in the Rule 803 and 804 exceptions.
42
 Second, the 
courts stressed the fact that at several junctures in the congressional 
deliberations over the residual exceptions, legislators feared that the 
residual exception would confer excessive discretion on trial judges and 
hoped that courts would use the exception sparingly in rare, extraordinary 
circumstances.
43
 Rather than conducting the overall assessment of 
circumstantial trustworthiness mandated by Rule 807(a)(1), these courts 
imported into Rule 807 the specific restrictions in the Rule 803 or 804 
exception most analogous to the fact situation. As a result, if the 
proponent’s foundation falls just short of satisfying those restrictions, 
exclusion under Rule 807 is mandatory. 
C. Importing Restrictions from Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) into Rule 
803(6) 
Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8) both fall under Rule 803, 
which is the overall provision listing hearsay exceptions that do not require 
a foundational showing of the declarant’s unavailability at the time of 
trial.
44
 Specifically, Rule 803(6) codifies the business entry exception. As 
restyled in 2011, the rule explicitly requires proof of the following 
foundational facts: 
$ “[T]he record was made at or near the time” of the recorded 
event; 
$ The ultimate source of the information in the record was an 
individual with personal knowledge; 
$ “[T]he record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted 
activity of a business;” and 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. at 837; see United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1467 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(Easterbrook, J. & Bauer, C.J., concurring) (“Temptation to get ‘round this limitation by 
moving to Rule 804(b)(5) . . . should be resisted.”); Latson v. Clarke, 346 F. Supp. 3d 831, 
857 (W.D. Va. 2018) (noting that a liberal interpretation of the residual exception “would 
easily cause the exception to swallow the rule”) (quoting United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 
385, 394 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
 43. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239, 247–52 (1978) (reviewing the 
congressional deliberations over the proposed residual exceptions) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried, Scope of the Residual Hearsay]; see Latson, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 856–57 (“The 
residual exception ‘is a narrow exception that should not be construed broadly’ . . . .”) 
(quoting Dunford, 148 F.3d at 394). 
 44. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), (8). 
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The definition of “regularly conducted activity” in a Rule 803(6)(B) 
“business, organization, occupation, or calling,”
46
 is expansive enough to 
include a government organization. The rule does not contain any language 
barring the use of an otherwise admissible business entry in criminal cases. 
On its face, restyled Rule 803(8) applies to government organizations.
47
 
Rule 803(8)(A)(i) authorizes the receipt of records that reflect “the office’s 
[own] activities,” such as office transactions.
48
 With one exception, Rule 
803(8)(A)(ii) permits the admission of records documenting “a matter 
observed while under a legal duty to report,” even if the observation occurs 
outside the office.
49
 Such evidence is admissible unless it concerns “a 
matter observed by law-enforcement personnel” during a criminal case.
50
 
Similarly, Rule 803(8)(A)(iii) allows the introduction of records stating 
“factual findings from a legally authorized investigation.”
51
 However, Rule 
803(8)(A)(iii) permits the admission of factual findings in all civil cases “or 
against the government in a criminal case.”
52
 In other words, the exception 
provides that otherwise admissible factual findings are inadmissible against 
the criminally accused. 
Like Rules 608 and 609, Rules 803(6) and 803(8) appear to be 
independent provisions, thus raising the possibility that a proponent may 
invoke Rule 803(6) even when Rule 803(8) is inapplicable. Yet, the Second 
Circuit opened a contrary line of authority when it held otherwise in its 
1977 decision, United States v. Oates.
53
 In Oates, a drug prosecution case, 
the prosecution offered a report and worksheet prepared by a United States 
Customs Service chemist at trial.
54
 The report stated that the powder seized 
from the defendant was heroin.
55




                                                                                                             
 45. Id. 803(6). 
 46. Id. 803(6)(B).  
 47. Id. 803(8). 
 48. Id. 803(8)(A)(i). 
 49. Id. 803(8)(A)(ii). On its face, the provision is not limited to matters observed on the 
office’s premises. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 803(8)(A)(iii). 
 52. Id.  
 53. 560 F.2d 45, 68 (2d Cir. 1977).  
 54. Id. at 63–64.  
 55. Id. at 63.  
 56. See id. at 64–66. 
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The first theory was that the report qualified as an official record under 
Rule 803(8), but the court rejected that theory on two grounds.
57
 First, the 
court stated that the conclusions in the report were clearly “factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by 
law.”
58
 Consequently, the conclusions were excluded under then-existing 
Rule 803(8)(C),
59
 which corresponds to the current Rule 803(8)(A)(iii).
60
 
Second, the court ruled that the report’s conclusions were also inadmissible 
under then-existing Rule 803(8)(B),
61
 which corresponds to the current 
Rule 803(8)(A)(ii).
62
 The court reasoned that the report fell within Rule 
803(8)(B)’s exception for “matters observed by police officers and other 
law enforcement personnel.”
63
 In the court’s view, the Customs Service 
agents were “law enforcement personnel” under the statute.
64
 The court 
stated it had to “read [the exception] broadly enough to make its 
prohibitions against the use of government-generated reports in criminal 




The prosecution’s second theory was that the chemists’ report constituted 
an admissible business entry under Rule 803(6).
66
 Rule 803(6) did not 
contain either of the express exceptions set out in Rule 803(8); nevertheless, 
the court stated that it must bar the report under Rule 803(6) as well.
67
 The 
court asserted that “there [was] a clear congressional intent that such 
documents be inadmissible against a” criminal defendant, despite the fact 
“that the chemist’s documents might appear to be within the literal 
                                                                                                             
 57. Id. at 66–68. 
 58. Id. at 67. 
 59. Id.  
 60. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.  
 61. Oates, 560 F.2d at 67 (“Though with less confidence, we believe that the chemist’s 
documents might also fail to achieve status as public records under FRE 803(8)(B) because 
they are records of ‘matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement 
personnel.’”). 
 62. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 63. Oates, 560 F.2d at 67. 
 64. Id. at 68 (construing the language “to include, at the least, any officer or employee 
of a governmental agency which has law enforcement responsibilities”). 
 65. Id. at 67–68 (citing United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 968–69 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 
1975)). 
 66. Id. at 66; see also id. at 74–80. 
 67. Id. at 68 (“Our conclusion that the chemist’s report and worksheet do not satisfy the 
standards of FRE 803(8) comports perfectly with what we discern to be clear legislative 
intent not only to exclude such documents from the scope of FRE 803(8) but from the scope 
of FRE 803(6) as well.”). 
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language of FRE 803(6).”
68
 The court read the extrinsic legislative history, 
and found the drafters had manifested a firm intention in the legislative 
history of Rule 803(8)
69
 to render such reports absolutely inadmissible 
under any theory: “The result Congress intended was the absolute 
inadmissibility of records of this nature . . . .”
70
  
The court pointed to passages in both the Advisory Committee Note 
accompanying Rule 803(8) and passages in the congressional deliberations 
over the rules. The court quoted the Advisory Committee’s statement that 
the exceptions stated in Rule 803(8) were needed because of the “almost 
certain collision with [Sixth Amendment] confrontation rights which would 
result from [the] use [of such reports] against an accused in a criminal 
case.”
71
 The court then noted passages in the House and Conference 
Committee proceedings in which legislators who played prominent roles in 
proposing the 803(8) exceptions voiced a wide concern on confrontation 
clause grounds,
72
 which would be equally applicable whether the court 
admitted the record as an official record or business entry. The court 
reasoned that the legislative history dictated a ruling that if the conclusions 
in a government document constituted inadmissible findings under then-
existing Rule 803(8)(C) (the current Rule 803(8)(A)(iii)), the document had 
to be “similarly disqualified under any exception to the hearsay rule.”
73
 The 
court frankly acknowledged that it was reading the Rule 803(8)(C) 
restriction into Rule 803(6).
74
 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 75.  
 69. See id. at 79 (“We thus consider it clear that Congress has expressed a firm intention 
that, if there are plausible doubts that evidence fitting within the literal terms of a hearsay 
exception could survive confrontation analysis, the hearsay exception should be construed 
with considerable flexibility so that the court can, if possible, avoid deciding the 
constitutional question.”). 
 70. Id. at 69; see also id. at 72, 77. See also Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, 
Policing the Admissibility of Body Camera Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1446 
(2019) (referring to “the so-called ‘law enforcement’ exception to the public records hearsay 
exception”). 
 71. Oates, 560 F.2d at 79 (quoting Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 313 (1972)). 
 72. See id. at 69–73. 
 73. Id. at 72. 
 74. Id. at 78 (“Even if the remarks of Representatives Hungate and Dennis were not as 
clear as they are, we could still reach the same conclusion that, in view of the articulated 
purpose behind the narrow drafting of FRE 803 in general and FRE 803(8) in particular, 
FRE 803(6) must be read in conjunction with FRE 803(8)(B) and (C).”).  
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II. The Modern Textualist Approach to Statutory Construction: The Role of 
Context and Extrinsic Legislative History in General and in the Specific 
Setting of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
It is true that there have been and, in some jurisdictions, still are, 
approaches to statutory construction other than textualism. For a long 
period in modern American legal history, the prevailing view was the legal 
process school of thought.
75
 That approach presumed that legislators act in 
good faith and in pursuit of the public good.
76
 Given that benign 
presumption, courts routinely attached great weight to extrinsic legislative 
history material; if legislators almost always act in bona fides, the 
legislative history materials they generate ought to be just as reliable as the 
statutory text they vote on. As a result, during this period, courts often 
based interpretive decisions on legislative history and disregarded the 
apparent plain meaning of the statutory text.
77
  
However, law and economics scholars and political scientists sharply 
criticized this approach as idealistic
78
 to the point of being unrealistic.
79
 
Their analyses and research demonstrated that, in many cases, legislation 
represents an amoral deal between particular reelection-minded legislators
80
 
and special interest groups.
81
 That insight led to the emergence of 
textualism, the now dominant approach, especially in federal court—which 
has led to a rethinking of the wisdom of relying on extrinsic legislative 
history material.
82
 It is undeniable that textualism has its critics.
83
 However, 
                                                                                                             
 75. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond “Top Down” Grand Theories of Statutory 
Construction: A “Bottom Up” Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 
OR. L. REV. 389, 399–400 (1996) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 628 
(1990) (noting that “strongly contradictory legislative history can trump plain meaning”). 
 78. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 609 (1988). 
 79. See id. at 572.  
 80. Id. at 333–34. 
 81. See id. at 710 (discussing lobbyists attempt to modify language of legislative 
reports). 
 82. See Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond, supra note 75, at 400–04; see also infra note 84. 
 83. See generally Joseph Kimble, Ideological Judging: The Record of Textualism, 
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 2018, at 79; Stephen F. Ross, The Limited Relevance of Plain Meaning, 73 
WASH. U.L.Q. 1057 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Daubert’s Guide to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: A Not-So-Plain-Meaning Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. J. LEGIS. 3 (1995); Glen 
Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992). 
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a review of the Statutes headnotes in any recent Federal Reporter or Federal 
Supplement advance sheet will readily demonstrate that, today, federal 
judges overwhelmingly apply a textualist approach to legisprudential 
issues.
84
 Although one of the Court’s more conservative jurists, Justice 
Scalia, was one of the early advocates of textualism, one of the more liberal 
jurists, Justice Kagan, has remarked, “We’re all textualists now.”
85
 For that 
reason, because of the emergence and continued foreseeable dominance of 
textualism, this article looks to evaluate the three lines of federal authority 
discussed in Part I through a textualist lens. 
A. Textualism in General 
1. The Decline in the Importance of Extrinsic Legislative History 
As previously stated, this is the Age of Statutes.
86
 Increasingly, legal 
disputes are resolved by an interaction between the judicial and legislative 
branches—namely, a judge’s interpretation of a rule crafted by a legislature, 
rather than a rule formulated by a court. The increased frequency of such 
interactions intensifies the focus on the constitutional doctrine of separation 
                                                                                                             
 84. For example, the most recent federal court advance sheets indicate a number of 
opinions stating textualist views. See, e.g., Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 415–16 (5th Cir. 
2019); Warner v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 931 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2019). The same 
pattern is evident in the most recent federal supplement advance sheets. Paczkowski v. My 
Choice Family Care, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 991, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Dorbor v. United 
States, 379 F. Supp. 3d 765, 768–69 (W.D. Wis. 2019); Urbain Pottier v. Hotel Plaza Las 
Delicias, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 130, 134 (D.P.R. 2019).  
One is hard pressed to find any reference to the older legal process approach to statutory 
construction. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence 
After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an 
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the 
Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 867 (1992) (noting an increase in “scholarly 
attention . . . to theories of statutory interpretation, particularly in light of the Court’s recent 
trend toward plain meaning”); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Brief Defense of the 
Supreme Court’s Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 27 IND. L. 
REV. 267, 268 (1993) (“In adopting the moderate textualist approach, most of the current 
Justices have rejected the traditional, legal process approach to statutory construction.”); 
Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of 
Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990) (“The Supreme Court has imposed the plain-
meaning standard of statutory interpretation on the Federal Rules of Evidence.”). See 
generally Eskridge, supra note 77; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation 
Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691 (1987).  
 85. Bryan A. Garner, It Means What It Says, ABA J., Apr. 2019, at 28, 28 (quoting 
Justice Elena Kagan).  
 86. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 23. 
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 In part, that focus may well have contributed to the emergence 
of the modern textualist approach to statutory construction. 
Simply stated, the touchstone of the textualist approach is the primacy of 
the text—the language of the statute being interpreted.
88
 As a formal matter, 
unlike extrinsic legislative history, such as committee reports and testimony 
at congressional hearings, the text of the statute has the force of law; the 
statutory language is the law.
89
 Legislators vote on and approve the text of a 
statute,
90
 not their personal thoughts about the statute.
91
 As Justice Jackson 
urged almost seventy years ago, the judge performing the interpretive task 
should conduct an “analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of 
Congress.”
92
 Admittedly, extrinsic legislative history can sometimes help 
                                                                                                             
 87. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The language . . . is plain on its face; and where that is so, then not only is 
there no need to resort to legislative history, but also, under the constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers, it is inappropriate to do so.”); see Jim Chen, Law as a Species of 
Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U.L.Q. 1263, 1296–98 (1995); Mark I. Schwartz, 
Conquering Separation Anxiety, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at 26. 
 88. United States v. Maturino, 887 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Text is the alpha and 
the omega of the interpretive process.”); Chen, supra note 87, at 1302 (“[T]he textualist 
recipe puts statutory language at the head of its interpretive sentences.”). 
 89. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 174 F. Supp. 3d 242, 261 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Statutes are 
law . . . .”) (quoting In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989)); Ariz. Contractors 
Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1046 (D. Ariz. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Chicanos 
Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The language of the 
statute . . . controls.”) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 
568 (2005); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 n.4 (2002); 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62–63 (2002)); see also Sterk v. Redbox 
Automated Retail, LLC, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 2011), rev’d, 672 F.3d 535 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text . . . .”) (citing Exxon 
Mobil, 545 U.S. at 568); United States v. Cochran, 640 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Ohio 
2009) (noting that the text is an “authoritative statement”) (citing Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 
568); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“[T]he authoritative 
statement is the statutory text.”) (quoting City of Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. 
Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 390 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 90. Kaufman v. Holder, 686 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 2010); People v. Hunt, 88 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 524, 528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“[I]t is the language of the statute itself that has 
successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.”) (quoting Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky 
Stores, Inc., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)).  
 91. See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Legislation is an 
objective text approved in constitutionally prescribed ways; its scope is not limited by the 
celebrations of those who voted for or signed it into law.”). 
 92. United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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one construe the language, but only the statute has the status of law.
93
 In 
light of the doctrine of separation of powers,
94
 courts have a formal, 
constitutional obligation to respect the linguistic choices made by the 
legislature
95
 because those words are the best reflection of the legislature’s 
policy choices embedded in the statute.  
The case for textualism, though, rests on more than formalism. Since 
World War II, political science research has exposed the extent to which 
special interest groups can influence—and manipulate—the process which 
generates legislative history materials such as committee reports.
96
 The 
Supreme Court has even recognized that practical danger and cautioned 
against uncritical reliance on extrinsic legislative history material.
97
 
Given these formal and practical considerations, two schools of 
textualism have developed. The more extreme school takes the position that 
if a judge reviews the text and context of a statute and concludes that the 





 In that event, the judge treats the plain meaning as 
                                                                                                             
 93. Hunt, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 528 (“Not even the most reliable document of legislative 
history has the force of law.”) (citing City of Sacramento v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 545, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 94. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  
 95. Russell v. Choicepoint Servs, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 654, 664 (E.D. La. 2004); 
Oyuela v. Seacor Marine (Nigeria), Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 713, 724 (E.D. La. 2003), aff’d, 
201 F. App’x 269 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 
 96. Lujan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 69 F.3d 1511, 1518 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Statutes 
may have multiple purposes and may represent a compromise between competing 
considerations.”) (citations omitted); In re Vizio, Inc., Consumer Privacy Litig., 238 F. 
Supp. 3d 1204, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (noting there are “pitfalls that plague too quick a turn 
to the more controversial realm of legislative history”) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 
526, 526 (2004)); United States v. Smith, 593 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954 (E.D. Ky. 2009) 
(explaining that legislative history has “limited utility and reliability”) (quoting City of 
Cookeville v. Upper Cumberland Elec. Membership Corp., 484 F.3d 380, 390 n.6 (6th Cir. 
2007)); see also Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the Law of 
Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717, 1744 (1995); Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 329, 356–57 (1995) (discussing Arrow’s Paradox).  
 97. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568–70 (2005). 
 98. United States v. One 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, 248 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous, . . . this first canon is also the last: judicial 
inquiry is complete.”) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)); 
Rodriguez v. Carson, 377 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“When the words of a 
statutes are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”) 
(quoting Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
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 99. United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2019); Beevan & Assocs., 
LPA, Inc. v. Yost, 929 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Where ‘the meaning of a statute is 
unambiguous and definite, it must be applied as written and no further interpretation is 
necessary.’”) (quoting State ex rel. Prade v. Ninth Dist. Court of Appeals, 2017-Ohio-7651, 
¶ 14, 87 N.E.3d 1239, 1242); Doe v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 926 F.3d 235, 260 
(6th Cir. 2019) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.”) (quoting 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)); Warner v. Experian Info. Sols., 
Inc., 931 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Thus, our inquiry begins . . . , and ends . . . if the 
statutory text is unambiguous.”) (quoting Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 
946, 951 (9th Cir. 2009)); Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 916 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 
2019) (“When . . . ‘a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ends.’”) 
(quoting Christie v. Ga.-Pac. Co., 898 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2018)); Sucic v. Wilkie, 921 
F.3d 1095, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Our inquiry ceases ‘if the statutory language is 
unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting Barnhart v. 
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)); Hall v. United States, 677 F.3d 1340, 1346 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank, 677 F.3d at 254); see, e.g., Paczkowski v. My 
Choice Family Care, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 3d 991, 993 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (“‘Statutory 
interpretation begins with—and, absent ambiguity, is confined to—the language of the 
statute’ . . . .”) (quoting Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 2001 WI 81, ¶ 10, 244 
Wis.2d 758, 628 N.W.2d 833); Urbain Pottier v. Hotel Plaza Las Delicias, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 
3d 130, 134 (D.P.R. 2019) (“Statutory construction in Puerto Rico begins with the text of the 
underlying statute, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting Oquendo-
Lorenzo v. Hosp. San Antonio, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 3d 103, 107 (D.P.R. 2017)); Thompson v. 
Does 1-5, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (“A determination of what the 
[statute] requires ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is 
unambiguous.’”) (quoting BedRoc  Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004)); Town 
of Dutch John v. Daggett Cty., 367 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1297 (D. Utah 2019) (“‘[I]f the 
statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ the 
court's inquiry ends there.”) (quoting Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450); Glob. Tropical Imps. & 
Exps. LLC v. Bernhardt, 366 F. Supp. 3d 110, 115 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The Court's inquiry 
‘begins with the statutory text’ and ‘ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’”) 
(quoting BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 183); United States v. Patara, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 
(S.D. Cal. 2019) (“Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if 
the text is unambiguous.”) (quoting Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951); League of Conservative 
Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019) (“Judicial ‘inquiry begins with the 
statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’”) (quoting BedRoc, 541 
U.S. at 183); Tugaw Ranches, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 362 F. Supp. 3d 879, 881 (D. 
Idaho 2019) (“Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the court 's inquiry is at an 
end.”) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 631 (2018); Wade v. 
Burns, 361 F. Supp. 3d 306, 310 (D. Conn. 2019) (“Our inquiry must cease if the statutory 
language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.”) (quoting 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)); Jax Leasing, LLC v. Xiulu Ruan, 359 
F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1137 (S.D. Ala. 2019) (“Although the rule is not always honored, ‘our 
inquiry into the meaning of [a] statute's text ceases when the statutory language is 
unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.’”) (quoting Matal v. Tam, 
137 S. Ct. 1744, 1756 (2017)). 
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conclusive of the statute’s interpretation.
100
 Unless the judge finds that the 
statutory language is ambiguous
101
 and lacks a plain meaning, the judge 
need not (and should not) even consider extrinsic legislative history 
material,
102
 which might suggest a contrary meaning.
103
 Finding that the 
statutory text lacks a plain meaning is a condition precedent to resorting to 
extrinsic material; and if the judge finds a plain meaning, the judge may not 




Although the strict textualist school has adherents, a more moderate 
version of textualism enjoys greater popularity among the courts. Moderate 
textualists believe that a judge may at least consider extrinsic material, even 
when the statute superficially
105
 appears to have a plain meaning.
106
 
However, moderate textualists respect the primacy of the statutory language 
                                                                                                             
 100. Electrolux Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 101. See In re W. Iowa Limestone, Inc., 538 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A statute . . . 
is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ or be uncertain as to the meaning of the 
statute.”) (quoting City of Waterloo v. Bainbridge, 749 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Iowa 2008)); 
Carter Tr. ex rel. Forston v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 2d 536, 540 (N.D. Tex. 2003) 
(starting analysis with the interpretation of the statutory language). 
 102. In re Larson, 513 F.3d 325, 329 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[L]egislative history does not 
trump unambiguous statutory text.”) (citing Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)); 
Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that when “the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, [the court] will not create an ambiguity 
through the use of legislative history”); United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th 
Cir. 2004); Toyota Land Cruiser, 248 F.3d at 903 (“If the statute’s meaning is clear, we will 
not consider legislative history.”). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 2006) (reviewing 
Congress’s construction of a statute to determine the meaning of the language and finding 
ambiguity in the history contradicted the plain meaning). 
 104. In re Universal Seismic Assocs., Inc., 288 F.3d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 2002) (“This 
Circuit has also noted that when a plain reading of a statute precludes one party’s 
interpretation, ‘no legislative history—be it ever so favorable—can redeem it.’”) (quoting 
Nalle v. Comm’r, 997 F.2d 1134, 1140 (5th Cir. 1993)).  
 105. United States Telecom Ass’n v. FBI, 276 F.3d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Of 
course, legislative history may ‘shed new light on congressional intent, notwithstanding 
statutory language that appears superficially clear.’”) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. 
Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 106. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., 476 F.3d 1261, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that the court may look beyond plain text to ensure the statute’s purpose is 
fulfilled); Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass’n v. Governing Bd. S. Orange Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 21 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 451, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“[I]n rare cases, statutory ambiguity is not a 
condition precedent to further interpretation, and the literal meaning of the words may be 
disregarded to avoid absurd results.”). 
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 presumption in favor of the 
apparent plain meaning. Although this school of thought permits the judge 
to consider extrinsic material, it still sets a high bar
109
 and imposes an 
onerous burden on the party urging the court to reject the plain meaning 
interpretation.
110
 Given the practical risks of relying on extrinsic material, 
the judge must proceed cautiously
111
 because appellate courts have 
cautioned trial judges that the cases in which legislative history trumps 
                                                                                                             
 107. Tyler v. Douglas, 280 F.3d 116, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Greene v. United 
States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1355 (2d Cir. 1996)); United States v. Koh, 199 F.3d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“The ‘strong presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses 
congressional intent’ can only be rebutted ‘when a contrary legislative intent is clearly 
expressed.’”) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991)); United States v. 
Mack, 164 F.3d 467, 471–72 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135); United 
States v. Wallace, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1132 (D. Ariz. 2007) (citing Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 
135); In re Worldcom, Inc. Secs. Litig., 308 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding 
that a clear, contrary legislative intent can rebut the strong presumption in favor of the 
statutory text) (citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101, 110 (2d Cir. 
2001)). 
 108. United States v. Bloch, 762 F. Supp. 2d 115, 119–20 (D.D.C.), rev’d on other 
grounds, 800 F. Supp. 2d 165 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding the rebuttable presumption exists 
when proponent can show “Congress did not mean what is appears to have said, or that, as a 
matter of logic and statutory structure, it almost surely could not have meant it”) (internal 
citation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterp., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 
(1989)); Lingenfelter v. Cty. of Fresno, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“The 
presumption . . . is not conclusive.”).  
 109. Forte v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 763 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 780 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The ‘bar for reworking the words our Legislature 
passed into law is high.’”) (quoting Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 
630 (Tex. 2013)); Consumer Elecs. Ass’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(noting “the bar is high”) (quoting Williams Cos. v. FERC, 345 F.3d 910, 914 (D.D.C. 
2003)). 
 110. See, e.g., Bloch, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 120 (finding that proponent did not show any 
contrary intent). 
 111. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95–96 (1985) (“Going behind the plain 
language of a statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is a step to be 
taken cautiously even under the best circumstances.”) (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. 
Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. 
Phillips, 543 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Going behind the plain language of a 
statute in search of a possibly contrary congressional intent is a step to be taken 
cautiously . . . .”) (quoting Locke, 471 U.S. at 95–96); Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 
1015, 1017 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Am. Tobacco, 456 U.S. at 75); Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 286 F.3d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[E]ven in 
its secondary role legislative history must be used cautiously.”) (quoting Aviall Servs., Inc. 
v. Cooper Indus., Inc., 263 F.3d 134, 140–41 (5th Cir. 2001)).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2
2020]  LIMITS OF LEGITIMATE CONTEXTUAL INTERPRETATION 251 
 
 




 There is a wealth of authority 
that has held that judges should find the presumption is rebutted only in 
exceptional cases
114
 where the party opposing the plain meaning 







 powerful showing that the statute’s seemingly plain 
meaning is at odds with the legislative intent.
118
 
                                                                                                             
 112. U.S. Fleet Servs., Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 141 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (N.D. Tex. 
2001). 
 113. United States v. Tobeler, 311 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Middle 
Mountain Land & Produce, Inc. v. Sound Commodities Inc., 307 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 
2002)); Hillman v. IRS, 263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[E]xceptions to the Plain 
Meaning Rule . . . ‘are, and should be, exceptionally rare.’”) (quoting Sigmon Coal Co. v. 
Apfel, 226 F.3d 291, 304 (4th Cir. 2000)); Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 
181 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999 (D. Minn. 2001) (“Upon a finding that the statutory terms are 
unambiguous, further judicial inquiry is only called for in rare and exceptional 
circumstances . . . .”) (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)); United 
States v. Siart, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 (D. Or. 2001) (“This presumption is ‘rebutted 
only in rare and exceptional circumstances, when a contrary legislative intent is clearly 
expressed.’”) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135–36 (1991)).  
 114. See Martinez v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1327–28 
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (“If, after doing so, the meaning of the text is clear, in all but highly 
exceptional cases the analysis is complete and goes no further.”) (citing Garcia v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984)). 
 115. Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Cos., LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2002) 
(“In some situations, however, what would otherwise appear to be plain language is 
interpreted contrarily where there are compelling indications of legislative intent.”) (citing 
Cty. of L.A. v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526 (Cal. 1942)). 
 116. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros. Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir. 
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. 
526 U.S. 344 (1999) (“It is true that ‘[i]n rare and exceptional circumstances, we may 
decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence 
demonstrates a legislative intent contrary to the text’s plain meaning.’”) (quoting Boca Ciega 
Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 238 (11th Cir. 1995)).  
 117. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“[O]nly the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will justify a departure from that 
language.”) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); FTC v. Shire Viropharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(“When the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the [text] is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”) 
(quoting Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011)); 
Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302 (same) (quoting In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.39 298, 314 
(3d Cir. 2010)); Standiferd v. U.S. Tr., 641 F.3d 1209, 1213–14 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Only the 
most extraordinary showing of a contrary legislative intent can justify our departure from the 
plain meaning of the statutory language.”) (citing Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 
(1984)); United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Absent ambiguity in the 
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2. The Increased Importance of Context and Its Legitimate Uses 
Context has always played an important role in statutory construction. 
However, that observation is even truer today; at the same time that 
textualism has depreciated extrinsic legislative history, textualism has also 
enhanced the importance of context. Like statutory text—and unlike 
extrinsic material—context has the force of law because it is found in other 
parts of the same statutory scheme. Moreover, while special interest groups 
may exert manipulative influence over committee material behind the 
scenes and out of the public view, like the text that must be interpreted, the 
context must be voted on publicly. 
The maxim noscitur a sociis reflects the traditionally understood 
importance of context:
119
 it “should be determined by words immediately 
surrounding it”
120
 or “a word is known by the company it keeps.”
121
 The 
basic tenet of “whole act”
122
 or contextual interpretation is that the 
                                                                                                             
statutory text, ‘[o]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in the legislative 
history will justify a departure from [the statutory] language.’”) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. 
at 680); United States v. Sabri, 326 F.3d 937, 943 (8th Cir. 2003), aff’d, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) 
(same) (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 680); Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232 
F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be 
the language of the statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry 
into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”) 
(quoting Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling, Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992)); New York v. 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 263 F. Supp. 2d 650, 659 n.15 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (same) 
(citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 70); United States v. Nipper, 198 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821 (W.D. La. 
2002) (same) (citing Garcia, 469 U.S. at 75); S. States Coop. Inc. v. I.S.P. Co., Inc., 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 807, 813 (N.D. W. Va. 2002) (“Furthermore, where a statute is unambiguous, 
legislative history is ‘instructive only upon “the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions.”’”) (quoting Olmsted v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 2002)).  
 118. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 582 F.3d 156, 169–70 
(1st Cir. 2009); In re Palmer, 219 F.3d 580, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2000); Red Lake Band of 
Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–26 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 119. See People v. Hernandez, 215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) 
(describing the term to mean that “a word takes meaning from the company it keeps”) 
(quoting People v. Drennan, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)); Ass’n of 
Irritated Residents v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., 85 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 590, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he meaning of a word may be enlarged or restrained 
by reference to the intent of the whole clause in which it is used.”) (citing People v. Stout, 95 
Cal. Rptr. 593, 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)). 
 120. Noscitur a sociis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 121. SBC Inc. v. FCC, 414 F.3d 486, 506 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle 
& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).  
 122. See United States v. Salim, 287 F. Supp. 2d 250, 335–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(discussing the Whole Act rule). 
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interpretation of statutory text is a holistic endeavor.
123





 or in a vacuum.
126
 Rather, the text 
                                                                                                             
 123. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 
371 (1988) (“Statutory construction, however, is a holistic endeavor.”); R. H. Donnelley 
Corp. v. United States, 641 F.3d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e consider all the words 
employed and do not review isolated phrases.”) (quoting United States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666, 
668 (4th Cir. 2010)); Vectra Fitness v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(“[S]tatutory interpretation is a ‘holistic endeavor’ that requires consideration of a statutory 
scheme in its entirety.”) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 371); Trs. of the Chi. Truck 
Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Ind.) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transp. 
Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Indeed, statutory interpretation ‘is a holistic 
endeavor and, at a minimum, must account for a statute’s full text, language as well as 
punctuation, structure, and subject matter.’”) (quoting U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. 
Agents, 508 U.S. 439, 454–56 (1993)); Goodman Mfg., L.P. v. United States, 69 F.3d 505, 
510 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified 
by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .”) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n, 484 U.S. at 
371); see, e.g., Filush v. Town of Weston, 266 F. Supp. 2d 322, 327, 330 (D. Conn. 2003) 
(reading Title II of the ADA “in the context of the overall . . . statutory scheme” led the court 
to a different conclusion than the majority of courts). 
Over the decades, the courts have found numerous, colorful ways of capturing this 
notion. Some of the most distinguished American jurists have virtually waxed poetic about 
this notion: 
$ Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (“A word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may 
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in 
which it is used.”) (citing Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916)).  
$ NLRB v. Federbush Co., Inc., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (L. Hand, J.) 
(“Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal 
existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but 
all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are 
used . . . .”). 
 124. In re Jacqueline L., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (ordered not 
published) (“Also, proper textual exegesis requires that a statute be construed as a whole, 
rather than in atomistic bits.”). 
 125. Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 541 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Act[s] of Congress . . . 
should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions.”) (quoting Soliman v. 
Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 282 (4th Cir. 2005)); Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc., 393 P.3d 375, 
381 (Cal. 2017) (“We do not construe statutory language in isolation . . . .”) (quoting Dep’t 
of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 145 P.3d 462, 
468 (Cal. 2006)); People v. Dorsey, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 501–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) 
(“[E]ach sentence must be read not in isolation but in light of the statutory scheme . . . .”) 
(quoting Lungren v. Deukmejian, 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988)).  
 126. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 789 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Put simply, 
courts must recognize that Congress does not legislate in a vacuum.”) (citing Thinking 
Machs. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. #1 (In re Thinking Machs.), 67 F.3d 1021, 1025 
(1st Cir. 1995)); Loving v. IRS, 917 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 742 F.3d 1013 
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to be construed should be viewed as part of the entire statutory scheme
127
 in 
order to ensure its overall rational coherence.
128
 Hence, in a given case, the 




a) The Broad Meaning of “Context” 
On one hand, courts construe “context” broadly. Given the breadth of the 
notion of “context,” courts may interpret: a word in a statutory sentence in 
light of other words in the sentence;
130
 a sentence in a statute in light of 
other sentences in the same clause or subsection of the statute;
131
 one clause 
                                                                                                             
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Statutory language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum.’”) (quoting Roberts 
v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)); Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 372 F. Supp. 
2d 1062, 1069 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“At the same time, ‘statutory language cannot be construed 
in a vacuum.’”) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).  
 127. See United States v. Rigel Ships Agencies, Inc., 432 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 
2005) (per curiam) (“In any question of statutory interpretation, ‘[w]e do not look at one 
word or term in isolation, but instead we look to the entire statutory context.’”) (quoting 
United States v. DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999)); Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d 
at 1384 (reading a statute in light of case law to determine a section is unambiguous); 
Mendoza, 393 P.3d at 381 (“Statutory context also matters.”).  
 128. Mendoza, 393 P.3d at 381 (“We do not construe statutory language in isolation, but 
rather as a thread in the fabric of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part.”) (quoting 
Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 145 P.3d at 468; Berkeley Hillside Pres. v. City of 
Berkeley, 343 P.3d 834 (Cal. 2015)); Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877, 890 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“Our goal in interpreting a statute is to understand the statute as a 
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme . . . .”) (quoting Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 
412 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citation marks omitted); Ass‘n of Irritated 
Residents v. U.S. EPA, 632 F.3d 584, 596 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing step one of Chevron) 
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); Greenbaum v. U.S. EPA, 370 
F.3d 527, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A court must therefore interpret the statute as [] 
symmetrical and coherent . . . .”) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 
U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000)); United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994) (“If 
the statutory language is unambiguous, then provided that ‘the statutory scheme is coherent 
and consistent,’ our inquiry terminates.”) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 
489 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1989)). 
 129. See generally, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a Contextual Construction to Resolve 
the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1005 (1995). 
 130. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (“The meaning of a word that 
appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in 
light of the terms that surround it.”). 
 131. Westwood Apex v. Contreras, 644 F.3d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Given that ‘any’ 
and ‘all’ are used in relation to one another, they should be read that way and interpreted 
consistently with the sentence’s structure.”). 
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or subsection in light of other clauses or subsections;
132
 one major 
subdivision or title in a legislative scheme in light of other titles;
133
 and 
even a provision in one code in light of other codes that are deemed in pari 
materia
134
 because they address similar policy considerations. Thus, 
contextual interpretation has a long reach. 
b) The Uses of “Context” 
On the other hand, even contextual interpretation has its limits. The use 
of context to interpret ambiguously worded provisions and to define the 
scope of provisions can be a beneficial tool for the judiciary. However, 
courts can abuse context by importing restrictions from one provision into 
another, effecting what amounts to an amendment of the legislated scheme.  
(1) Using Wording from One Statutory Provision to Eliminate 
Ambiguities in the Wording of Another Provision  
The most common use of context is to help eliminate ambiguities in the 
wording of related statutes. There is consensus that courts may use the 




 the meaning 
                                                                                                             
 132. Va. Int’l Terminals, Inc. v. Edwards, 398 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder a 
longstanding canon of interpretation, adjacent statutory subsections that refer to the same 
subject matter . . . must be read in pari materia as if they were a single statue.”) (citing 
United States v. Srnsky, 271 F.3d 595, 602 (4th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Broncheau, 759 
F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (adopting the Virginia International approach to 
statutory interpretation); Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. 2d 33 
(D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 607 F.3d 860 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“‘[A] statute is to be reads as a whole,’ 
especially where construing adjacent subsections with remarkably similar structures.”) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)) 
(citing United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007)).  
 133. Mock v. S.D. Bd. of Regents, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (D.S.D. 2003) (analyzing 
Title VI and Title IX interchangeably). 
 134. Jackson v. Albany Appeal Bureau Unit, 442 F.3d 51, 54 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Since § 
2254 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘are generally seen as in pari materia,’ the reasoning of cases in 
the context of § 2254 petitions applies equally to § 2255 petitions.”) (quoting Kellogg v. 
Strack, 269 F.3d 100, 103 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001)); Asfaw v. Woldberhan, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323, 
332 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Statutes in one code may be considered with those in another 
code.”) (citing Estate of Burden v. Agnew, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 390, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)); 
Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(“The principle of striving for harmony between disparate parts applies even though the two 
provisions are in separate codes.”) (citing O’Brien v. Dudenhoeffer, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 826, 
829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 135. In re Mouzon Enters., Inc., 610 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that 
reviewing the whole statutory scheme together may help avoid conflict) (citing Burns v. 
Lawther, 53 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1995)). 
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of another statutory provision. The wording of Federal Rule of Evidence 
403 provides a salient example: 
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the 
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the 




This wording poses several interpretive issues. For instance, what is the 
meaning of “probative value”? Some early commentators suggested that 
when assessing the probative value of an item of evidence under Rule 403, 
a judge could consider the credibility of the source.
138
 However, later courts 
relied on contextual interpretation in rejecting that suggestion.
139
 Federal 
Rule of Evidence 104(b) is part of the context of Rule 403; and Rule 104(b) 
makes it clear that when the judge determines issues of conditional 
relevance, such as the sufficiency of a lay witness’s personal knowledge
140
 
or the authenticity of an exhibit,
141
 the judge must accept the proponent’s 
foundational testimony at face value.
142
 Lay jurors without any legal 
training are competent to decide whether a witness has firsthand knowledge 
or whether a letter is authentic. But, in order to protect the jury’s power to 
make the final decision on conditional relevance issues, the judge cannot 
consider the credibility of the evidence; the “judge must accept the 
                                                                                                             
 136. United States v. Webber, 536 F.3d 584, 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The ‘plain meaning’ 
of a statute, however, is often illuminated not only by its language but also by its structure.”) 
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001); Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 
622 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 137. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 138. Calvin W. Sharpe, Two-Step Balancing and the Admissibility of Other Crimes 
Evidence: A Sliding Scale of Proof, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 556, 589 (1984). 
 139. For example, in Adams v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1089 (S.D. Ind. 
1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 231 F.3d 414 (7th Cir. 2000), the court narrowed the 
scope of probative value “because to do otherwise would usurp the jury’s function.” That 
passage is an implicit invocation of Rule 104(b), since 104(b) safeguards the jury’s function 
in determining the weight of the evidence. Likewise, in Blackston v. Rapelje, 780 F.3d 340, 
357 (6th Cir. 2015), the court stated that it would be a misapplication of Rule 403 to invoke 
that provision to shield the jury from testimony because the trial judge had doubts about the 
credibility and reliability of the testimony. 
 140. FED. R. EVID. 602. 
 141. Id. 901. 
 142. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 887 (1988).  
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testimony at face value and inquire only whether, if believed,”
143
 the 
testimony possesses sufficient probative worth to support a permissive 
inference that the witness has firsthand knowledge or that the exhibit is 
authentic.
144
 In other words, if the jury elects to believe the testimony, will 
it support a rational, permissive inference of personal knowledge or 
authenticity? Given that understanding of Rule 104(b), courts have 
narrowed their interpretation of “probative value” under Rule 403.
145
 
Because Rule 403 applies to virtually every item of evidence,
146
 including a 
lay witness’s testimony and physical exhibits, if “probative value” 
encompassed the credibility of the source, a judge could do precisely what 
Rule 104(b) precludes judges from doing. 
Similarly, Rule 403 presents the question of what “unfair prejudice” 
means. The Advisory Committee Note accompanying Rule 403 states that 
an item of evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it creates a significant risk that 
the jury will decide the case on an improper basis.
147
 However, that 
statement begs the question: What is an improper basis? To at least partially 
answer that question, courts use contextual interpretation. Rules 404 and 
405 are not merely context for Rule 403; they are immediately adjacent 
provisions. Those provisions announce a general rule that while the 
prosecution may introduce evidence of a defendant’s uncharged misdeeds 
on a noncharacter theory of logical relevance, the prosecution may not 
proffer the evidence on the basis of simplistic character reasoning, such as 
“He or she did it once, therefore they did it again.”
148
 Testimony about a 
defendant’s other crimes is always relevant to show the defendant’s bad 
character, but what if the evidence is also relevant on a noncharacter theory 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. 
 144. See CARLSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 296–97; see also Blackston, 780 F.3d at 357 
(“[I]t was plainly a misapplication of Rule 403 to prevent the jury from hearing” testimony 
based on the judge’s doubts about the credibility of the testimony.); Adams, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 
1089 (“The weighing process under Rule 403 requires the judge to assume the credibility of 
a witness, because to do otherwise would usurp the jury’s function. Thus, the probative 
worth of eyewitness testimony as to an ultimate fact is presumed to be 100%.”) (internal 
citations omitted) (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5214).  
 145. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 146. Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. 
B.J. 21, 29 (1974) (“For example, Rule 403, which apparently cuts across the entire body of 
the Rules, allows ad hoc exclusion where prejudice, time, and the like are deemed to 
outweigh probativity.”). The exception is a conviction for an offense involving false 
statement or deceit under Rule 609(a)(2). FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).  
 147. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. 
 148. See FED. R. EVID. 404–05.  
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because it is a similar offense that tends to show the defendant’s intent or 
mens rea? If the judge nevertheless thinks that there is a substantial danger 
that the evidence will tempt the jury to lapse into forbidden character 
reasoning, the judge may exclude the evidence as unfairly prejudicial.
149
 
That might be the case if, albeit similar to the charged offense, the 
uncharged crime is much more heinous than the charged offense.
150
 Thus, 
courts may quite properly consider context—the character prohibition 
codified in Rules 404 and 405—to inform the meaning of “unfair 
prejudice” in Rule 403. 
(2) Using a Prohibition in One Statutory Provision to Limit the Scope of 
Another Provision  
Clarifying the meaning of a separate statutory provision is not the only 
legitimate use of contextual interpretation. It may also be used to limit the 
meaning of one provision to prevent the effective nullification of another 
provision.
151
 Consider Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a)(2), which purports 
to completely forbid the admission of testimony about a person’s nolo 
contendere plea to a crime.
152
 A litigant who seeks to introduce testimony 
about such a plea when suing that person might contend that the plea equals 
an admission or party-opponent statement that is admissible under Rule 
801(d)(2)(A).
153
 However, since Rules 410 and 801 are part of the same 
legislative scheme, Rule 410 is part of Rule 801’s context. As context, Rule 
410 precludes that interpretation of Rule 801. It is well-settled that in a 
coherent legislative scheme, one provision should not be construed to 
render another provision nugatory.
154
 
                                                                                                             
 149. 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:23 (rev. 
2004) [hereinafter IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT]. 
 150. Id. § 8:24, at 8–122 (citing John T. Johnson, The Admissibility of Evidence of 
Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal Cases, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 69, 74 (1972)); P.B. Carter, 
The Admissibility of Similar Facts Evidence, 69 L. Q. REV. 80, 92 (1953). 
 151. Horn v. CIR, 968 F.2d 1229, 1239–40 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“A canon of interpretation 
cannot nullify part of a statute.”)  
 152. FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(2). 
 153. Id. 801(d)(2)(A).  
 154. Courts use various expressions to convey this notion: 
$ The courts should not construe one provision as abrogating another. Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 294 F.3d 155, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 
249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
$ The court should not read one provision as rendering another a dead letter. 
Collins v. Sutter Mem’l Hosp., 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(“Construction of a statute that would render it a dead letter is disfavored.”) 
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(citing Goehring v. Chapman Univ., 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2004)); Mabry v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010), superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.12(b), as recognized in 
Rockridge Tr. v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2013) 
(“California courts, quite naturally, do not favor constructions of statutes that 
render them advisory only, or a dead letter.”) (citing Petropoulos v. Dep’t of 
Real Estate, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. 
Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)). 
$ One provision should not be interpreted as destroying another. United States v. 
Rodriguez, 26 F.3d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (“The cardinal principle of statutory 
construction is to save and not to destroy.”) (quoting United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955)); Delarosa v. Boiron, Inc., 818 F. 
Supp. 2d 1177, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538–
39); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055, 1063 (W.D. Mich. 1997) 
(“The cardinal rule of statutory construction, however, is to save and not 
destroy.”) (citing United States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1145 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
$ One provision may not emasculate another. United States ex rel. Thacker v. 
Allison Engine Co., Inc., 471 F.3d 610, 617 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated on other 
grounds, 553 U.S. 662 (2008) (“The ‘cardinal principle of statutory 
construction,’ however, is “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word 
of a statute rather than to emasculate an entire section.’”) (quoting Bennett v. 
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997)). 
$ One provision may not render another provision ineffective, inoperative, 
meaningless, or null. United States v. Thum, 749 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“It is axiomatic that ‘a statute should be construed so that effect is given 
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant.’”) (quoting Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)); 
Lucas v. Jerusalem Café, LLC, 721 F.3d 927, 937 (8th Cir. 2013) (“A reading 
that turns an entire subsection into a meaningless aside ‘is inadmissible, unless 
the words required it.’”) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
174 (1803)); United States v. Jonson, 325 F.3d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2003) (“It is 
a well settled canon of statutory construction that ‘a statute should be 
interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative.’”) (quoting Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979)); United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 58 
(1st Cir. 2002) (“[W]e will not readily adopt any construction that renders any 
such words or phrases meaningless, redundant, or superfluous.”) (citing Lopez-
Soto v. Hawayek, 175 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1999)); N.M. Cattle Growers 
Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Bridger Coal Co./Pac. Minerals, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp., 
927 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1991)); Mail Order Ass’n of Am. v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 986 F.2d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“First, we are to construe statutes, 
where possible, so that no provision is rendered ‘inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant.’”) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 
704 F.2d 1280, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1983)); J. E. Pierce Apothecary, Inc. v. 
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 119, 137 (D. Mass. 2005) 
(“An intention to enact a barren and ineffective provision is not lightly to be 
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(3) Incorporating a Restriction from One Statutory Provision to Rewrite 
Another 
In the three lines of authority described in Part I, the courts did not 
employ either of the accepted uses of contextual interpretation. To begin 
with, they are not simply considering context to remove ambiguities in the 
express wording of the provisions into which they are incorporating 
restrictions. Moreover, the incorporated restrictions do not take the form of 
flat prohibitions on any use of a particular type of evidence, such as Rule 
410’s ban on the admission of testimony about nolo contendere pleas; 
rather, on their face, the restrictions purport to merely limit the scope of the 
evidentiary doctrine set forth in that provision. 
As a general proposition, in the textualist era in these situations, it is 
unwarranted for the court to import restrictions from one provision into 
another. Standing alone, context does not give a court license to rewrite
155
 




 restrictions stated in another 
provision. Even if doing so would be consistent with the general “spirit” of 
                                                                                                             
imputed to the Legislature.”) (quoting Ins. Rating Bd. v. Comm’r of Ins., 248 
N.E.2d 500, 504 (Mass. 1969)); Pac Fung Feather Co., Ltd. v. United States, 
911 F. Supp. 529, 536 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1995), aff’d, 111 F.3d 114 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Or. v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332 
(1994)). 
 155. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 61 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Courts are not authorized to 
rewrite a statute . . . .”) (quoting Badaracco v. Comm’r, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984)); Qayumi 
v. Duke Univ., 350 F. Supp. 3d 432, 437 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (“[I]t is not the function of this 
court to re-write the statute.”) (quoting Cofield v. Crumpler, 179 F.R.D. 510, 516 (E.D. Va. 
1998)); Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 3d 1305, 1311 (M.D. Ga. 2018) (“But 
this Court cannot rewrite statutes to avoid what it may perceive to be an unintended 
consequence or even an absurd public policy result.”); City of Susanville v. Ca. Dep’t of 
Corr. & Rehab., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“We are not at liberty, 
however, to rewrite a statute to comport with our notion of wisdom or common sense.”). 
 156. Fourstar v. Garden City Grp., Inc., 875 F.3d 1147, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“It is not 
a judge’s job to add to or otherwise re-mold statutory test to try to meet a statute’s perceived 
policy objectives.”); People v. Hill, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“We do not 
have the power to add to statute what the Legislature left out.”) (citing Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Superior Court, 811 P.2d 1025 (Cal. 1991)). 
 157. People v. Superior Court of Placer Cty., 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 116, 125 n.6 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2013) (“In the construction of a statute . . . , the office of the Judge is simply to 
ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert [what] 
has been omitted”) (quoting CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1858); People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 149 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“When interpreting statutory language, the 
court may neither insert language that has been omitted nor ignore language that has been 
inserted.”) (citing People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997)). 
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 the provision in that fundamental 
fashion is an amendment
160
 within the province and power of the 
legislature, not the judiciary. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
observed, one of the most firmly established principles of statutory 
interpretation is that when legislatures choose to include restrictions in one 
provision but not another, courts should usually assume that the legislature 
did so purposely.
161
 With only slight overstatement, this principle has been 
described as “[a]n inveterate rule of statutory construction.”
162
 Courts 
broadly support this negative implication because it rests, in large part, on a 
common-sense inference.
163
 The usual circumstances, including a 
legislature’s express mention of a restriction in one provision but not 
another, make it very difficult to conclude that the omission of the 
restriction from the second provision is an oversight.
164
 For that matter, 
several factors can strengthen the inference that the omission was 
intentional. 
                                                                                                             
 158. In re Racing Servs., Inc., 779 F.3d 498, 504 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e [cannot] 
disregard the letter of a ‘clear and unambiguous’ statute ‘under the pretext of pursuing its 
spirit.’”) (quoting Gadeco, LLC v. Indus. Comm’n of State, 380 N.W.2d 535, 541 (N.D. 
2013)).  
 159. United States v. Crape, 603 F.3d 1237, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he fact that 
Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts a carte 
blanche to redraft statutes . . . .”) (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 95 (1985)). 
 160. In re Racing Servs., 779 F.2d at 505 (noting that the court “will not correct an 
alleged legislative ‘oversight’ by rewriting unambiguous statutes to cover the situation at 
hand”) (quoting Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad, 829 N.W.2d 453, 457 (N.D. 2013)). 
 161. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (noting that it is 
generally held that when Congress includes or excludes something it is intentional) (citing 
Rusello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)); BFP v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 511 U.S. 
531 (1994) (“[I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when 
it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.”) (quoting 
Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)); Russello, 464 U.S. at 23 (quoting 
United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)). 
 162. Schering Corp. v. Sullivan, 782 F. Supp. 645, 649 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated on other 
grounds, 995 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Russello, 464 U.S. at 23).  
 163. United States v. Olmos-Esparza, 484 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting the 
“maxim is ‘a product of logic and common sense’”) (quoting Longview Fibre Co. v. 
Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 690 
(9th Cir. 1992) (noting the same) (citing Alcarez v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 607 (9th Cir. 
1984)).  
 164. United States v. Neal, 249 F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Under normal 
statutory construction, we would not assume that the failure to include some item in a statute 
is an oversight that the court may correct.”).  
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First, consider whether the provisions were enacted at the same time. If 
the provisions were adopted at different times, the drafter might not have 
consulted the earlier provision before drafting the second provision. 
Second, determine whether the provisions were part of a legislative scheme 
that Congress deliberated over for a substantial period of time. When 
legislation is hurried,
165
 it is more plausible that the drafter was guilty of 
oversight. Finally, assess whether the provisions are proximate
166
 or even 
adjacent in the legislative scheme.
167
 Again, the closer the provisions are to 
each other, the weaker the inference of oversight. 
Yet, this generalization should not be applied mechanically because there 
are exceptions to the general rule.
168
 The inference of intentional omission 




 As Judge Posner has noted, 
statutory omissions sometimes are inadvertent.
171
 As previously stated, both 
extreme and moderate textualists are skeptical of extrinsic legislative 
history material.
172
 However, moderate textualists ordinarily do not object 
to judges routinely considering extrinsic material, even absent a finding that 
the statutory text lacks a plain meaning.
173
 As the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged, extrinsic evidence of congressional intent can occasionally 
be so strong that the court is justified in implying a restriction or exclusion 
                                                                                                             
 165. See, e.g., Uniroyal Chem. Co. Inc. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 246 (5th Cir. 
1998) (“Due to its hurried passage, it is widely recognized that many of CERCLA’s 
provisions lack clarity and conciseness.”).  
 166. United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 2001) (“This interpretation 
reflects the fundamental principle of statutory construction that ‘courts are obligated’ to give 
effect to Congress’s decision to use ‘different language in proximate subsections of the same 
statute.’”) (quoting United States v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir. 1994)). 
 167. See case cited supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also In re Fireside Bank 
Cases, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the courts should “look 
beyond neighboring law to the law as a whole”) (quoting Peatros v. Bank of Am. NT & SA, 
990 P.2d 539, 549 (Cal. 2000)).  
 168. In re Bourgeois, 902 F.3d 446, 447 (5th Cir. 2018) (“But the expressio unius canon 
is not meant to be mechanically applied.”); United States v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete 
Workers Union, 832 F. Supp. 674, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the general doctrine of 
expression unius est exclusion alterius “need not be mechanically applied”) (citing Cheney 
R.R. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 169. Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.3d 660, 666 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (“[T]his canon creates a potential inference, not a necessary one.”). 
 170. In re R.H., 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 650, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“R.H. also overlooks the 
fact that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius principle of statutory construction is not 
applied invariably . . . .”) (citing In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 369 (Cal. 2002)).  
 171. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985).  
 172. See supra notes 99–119 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
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that was omitted from the statutory language.
174
 In extreme cases,
175
 the 




B. The Application of the Textualist Framework to Decisions Whether to 
Import a Restriction Stated in One Federal Rule of Evidence into Another 
Rule 
Although Section II.A may be lengthy, it enables us to develop an 
approach to analyze the recurring fact pattern discussed in Part I. Again, in 
this fact pattern, 
$ There are two provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence; 
$ One provision expressly imposes a limitation on the evidentiary 
doctrine codified in that provision. The provision differs from 
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 completely barring evidence of 
nolo contendere pleas. Rather, the limitation purports to be a 
mere restriction on the scope of the doctrine set out in that 
provision;  
$ The second provision sets out a different evidentiary doctrine; 
and 
$ The second provision omits any mention of the restriction. 
It is submitted that, without more, contextual interpretation cannot justify 
importing the restriction into the second provision in these situations. These 
                                                                                                             
 174. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (explaining that the 
canons are not mandatory rules but rather helpful tools and that “other circumstances 
evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force”); see also Dow Chem. Co. & 
Subsidiaries v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 2d 748, 826 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (accepting the 
language from Chickasaw Nation) (quoting Chickasaw Nation, 534 U.S. at 94). 
 175. See Settle v. State, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (“We are 
compelled to add language only in extreme cases . . . .”) (quoting People v. Buena Vista 
Mines, Inc., 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 23 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).  
 176. See People v. Quiroz, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 925, 930 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that 
canons of statutory construction can be overcome when there is “a discernible and contrary 
legislative intent”) (quoting People v. Anzalone, 969 P.2d 160, 163 (Cal. 1999)); Samantha 
C. v. State Dep’t of Developmental Servs., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 415, 432 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“But this rule does not apply if there is a discernible and contrary legislative intent.”) (citing 
In re J.W., 57 P.3d 363, 369 (Cal. 2002)); Woodbury v. Brown-Dempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
124, 132–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Similarly, the ‘courts do not apply the expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius principle “if its operation would contradict a discernible and contrary 
legislative intent.”’”) (quoting In re J.W., 57 P.3d at 369).  
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are not cases in which (a) the wording of the first provision is helpful to 
remove an ambiguity in the wording of the text of the second provision or 
(b) the application of the second provision will render the first provision 
nugatory unless the restriction is read into the second provision. Moreover, 
in this setting, drawing a negative implication from the presence of a 
restriction in one provision and its omission in another provision is 
especially warranted. All of the pertinent factors that solidify the inference 
of intentional omission are present: (1) the original Federal Rules of 
Evidence all took effect at the same time in 1975;
177
 (2) the Advisory 
Committee and Congress spent years carefully deliberating over the 
wording of each provision;
178
 and (3) in some cases, the lines of authority 
discussed in Part I relate to adjacent provisions. In these cases, the 
contextual argument for treating the omission as an oversight is clearly too 
weak to justify importing the restriction into the second provision. 
Therefore, in these situations, courts should import the restriction from the 
first provision into the second provision only if extrinsic legislative history 
materials manifest a certain type of intent: an extraordinarily clear intent to 
altogether bar the admission of a particular type of evidence, not a 
qualitatively different, more limited intent to prevent the admission of that 
type of testimony under the evidentiary doctrine codified in the first 
provision. Using that standard, which, if any, of the lines of authority 
described in Part I are tenable? 
  
                                                                                                             
 177. CARLSON ET AL., supra note 3, at 15. 
 178. See id. at 14–15; see also Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond, supra note 75, at 418–19. 
Congress spent almost two full years considering the draft rules. The legislation 
initially blocking the Court’s promulgation of the rules was dated March 30, 
1973, and Congress finally approved the rules on January 2, 1975. During that 
period of time, the rules were considered by the House Special Committee on 
the Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, the House Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a Conference Committee. Their 
consideration was thorough. . . . Congress added to some rules . . . , deleted 
other rules . . . , and modified still other rules . . . . Congress did not give the 
draft rules a perfunctory, quick perusal; rather, Congress put the draft under a 
microscope and dissected it. The evident care with which the statute authors 
chose their words weighs strongly in favor of attaching great weight to those 
words. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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III. A Critical Evaluation of the Three Lines of Cases Importing a 
Restriction from One Federal Rules of Evidence Provision into Another 
Provision 
Section II.B proposed a test for determining when it is proper for a judge 
to import a restriction from one provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
into another provision. The test is a “both/and” proposition: the judge must 
find both that the extrinsic legislative history establishes a certain type of 
intent and that the history expresses that intent in an especially clear 
manner. The requisite intent must be to render a particular type of evidence 
completely inadmissible—not merely to impose a restriction under the first 
provision and bar the admission of that type of evidence under that 





 or extraordinarily clear.
181
 The 
question now becomes which, if any, of the three lines of authority 
described in Part I can withstand scrutiny under this standard. Do any 
amount to misreadings of the Federal Rules? 
A. Importing Restrictions from Rule 609 into Rule 608 
While Rule 609 refers to a witness’s “conviction,”
182
 Rule 608(b) refers 
to “specific instances of a witness’s [untruthful] conduct”
183
 with no 
language indicating that the Rule 609 restrictions apply under Rule 608(b) 
if the witness has been convicted of the untruthful act. Nevertheless, 
treating Rule 609 as context for Rule 608(b), several courts have held that 
Rule 609’s restrictions are implicated when the witness has already suffered 
                                                                                                             
 179. See Joseph v. J.J. MacIntyre Cos., LLC, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (“In some situations, however, what would otherwise appear to be plain language is 
interpreted contrarily where there are compelling indications of legislative intent.”) (citing 
Cty. of L.A. v. Frisbie, 122 P.2d 526 (Cal. 1942)). But see United States v. All Funds on 
Deposit in United Bank, 188 F. Supp. 2d 407, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“The language . . . is 
plain on its face; and where that is so, then not only is there no need to resort to legislative 
history, but also, under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, it is inappropriate 
to do so.”). 
 180. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. v. Murphy Bros. Inc., 125 F.3d 1396, 1398 (11th Cir. 
1997), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Murphy Bros. Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. 
526 U.S. 344 (1999) (“It is true that ‘[i]n rare and exceptional circumstances, we may 
decline to follow the plain meaning of a statute because overwhelming extrinsic evidence 
demonstrates a legislative intent contrary to the text’s plain meaning.’”) (quoting Boca Ciega 
Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 238 (11th Cir. 1995)).  
 181. See cases cited supra note 117.  
 182. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 183. Id. 608(b). 
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a conviction for the act.
184
 The consequence is that although the cross-
examiner may pose to the witness the questions allowed by Rule 609—the 
date and place of the conviction, the name of the offense, and the sentence 
imposed—the cross-examiner may not inquire further to probe the 
specifically untruthful aspects of the offense.
185
 
However, the extrinsic legislative history materials related to Rules 608 
and 609 are devoid of any clear indication that the Advisory Committee or 
Congress intended that a judge must apply the limited scope of inquiry 
permitted under Rule 609 when the underlying act also qualifies as a 
permissible target of impeachment under Rule 608(b). A fair reading of the 
extrinsic materials proves only that the drafters intended to impose certain 
restrictions under Rule 608(b) and other restrictions under Rule 609. 
Research reveals no passage in the legislative history where the drafters 
signaled that they wanted the limitations on Rule 609 to spill over into Rule 
608. 
Perhaps the strongest hint in the legislative history of importing 609 
restrictions into 608(b) is a passing reference to “[p]articular instances of 
conduct, though not subject to criminal conviction” in the second paragraph 
of the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 608(b).
186
 Again, there is no such 
reference in the text of the rule. Furthermore, even that paragraph does not 
avow an intent to either completely foreclose the use of 608(b) when there 
has been a conviction or to authorize partially incorporating Rule 609 
restrictions into Rule 608(b). Rather, the purpose of the paragraph is to 
discuss the probative dangers that can arise under Rule 608(b) and the 
safeguards in place to combat those dangers.
187
  
The final sentence of that paragraph notes that “the overriding protection 
of Rule 403” is a safeguard that applies to the cross-examiner’s inquiry.
188
 
The Rule 608(b) case law recognizes that the primary danger is a cross-
examiner’s bad faith attempt to besmirch the witness’s character by 
                                                                                                             
 184. See United States v. Albers, 93 F. 3d 1469, 1480 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
DeLeon, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1229, 1235 (D.N.M. 2018). 
 185. See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
 186. FED. R. EVID. 608(b) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules. Of course, 
when the cross-examiner has the witness’s conviction for the act in hand, there is little risk 
that the act did not occur or that the witness did not commit it. Moreover, the availability of 
a certified copy of conviction to establish the act reduces the risk that cross-examination 
about the act will consume an undue amount of time, which is one of the dangers mentioned 
in Rule 403. If that is the primary danger posed by this type of evidence, there is all the more 
reason to permit inquiry when the act is the subject of a conviction. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
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referring to an act that either did not occur, or which the witness did not 
commit. As a safeguard, these cases hold that, on a proper objection outside 
the jury’s hearing but on the record, the cross-examiner must recite a good-
faith basis in fact for believing that the act occurred and that the witness 
was the actor.
189
 Of course, when the cross-examiner has the witness’s 
conviction for an act in hand, there is little risk that there was no act or that 
someone else committed the act. In addition, the availability of a certified 
copy of conviction reduces the risk that the cross-examination will consume 
an undue amount of time—one of the probative dangers mentioned in Rule 
403. Thus, if the dangers mentioned in the Advisory Committee’s Note are 
the primary reasons for circumscribing inquiry under Rule 608(b) about an 
untruthful act, there is all the more reason to allow inquiry when the witness 
has been convicted of the act.  
Simply stated, the extrinsic materials do not establish the type of intent 
that would satisfy the test proposed in Section II.B. If such intent was 
established, when the witness has been convicted of an untruthful act, the 
judge ought to not only permit inquiry under Rule 608(b); but also the 
judge should not limit the scope of the inquiry to the questions permissible 
under Rule 609.
190
 Therefore, this line of authority fails. 
                                                                                                             
 189. See United States v. Courtney, 439 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2011) (not selected 
for publication); United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 680–81 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A 
prosecutor is allowed to ask questions in cross examination provided he has ‘some good-
faith factual basis for the incidents inquired about.’”) (quoting United States v. Bright, 588 
F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1979)); United States v. McCallum, 885 F. Supp. 2d 105, 116–17 
(D.D.C. 2012) (“Cross-examining counsel, however, ‘must have a reasonable basis for 
asking questions on cross-examination which tend to incriminate or degrade the witness and 
thereby create an unfounded bias which subsequent testimony cannot fully dispel.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
 190. See Courtney, 439 F. App’x at 385; Davis, 609 F.3d at 680–81; McCallum, 885 F. 
Supp. 2d at 116–17. The courts’ treatment of Rule 404(b) lends support to this conclusion. 
By its terms, Rule 404(b) allows the proponent to introduce evidence of “a crime, wrong, or 
other act” if the act is logically relevant on a noncharacter theory: 
 (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not 
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. 
 (2) Permitted Uses; . . . . This evidence may be admissible for another 
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Thus, like Rule 608(b), Rule 404(b) refers to specific acts of conduct 
with no mention of the word “conviction.” There is no authority that a proponent may not 
resort to Rule 404(b) if the act has resulted in a conviction. Quite to the contrary, the courts 
routinely accept the conviction as adequate proof of the act and, on that basis, permit the 
proponent to invoke Rule 404(b). 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT, supra note 
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B. Importing Restrictions from Rules 803 and 804 into Rule 807 
The importation of Rule 609’s restriction is unjustifiable because the 
relevant legislative history does not suggest the right sort of intent—
namely, an intent to altogether bar a type of evidence rather than to merely 
impose restrictions under a particular provision. Even when a judge can 
identify an indication of that intent in the extrinsic history, given the 
textualist devaluation of extrinsic history, the judge ought to import the 
restriction only if the history clearly and powerfully establishes that intent. 
In part, that is the problem with the “near miss” doctrine, which in effect 
imports restrictions from specific Rule 803 or 804 exceptions into Rule 807. 
The “near miss” cases read the history of the residual hearsay exception as 
manifesting an unmistakable legislative intent to invoke the exception only 
in extraordinary circumstances.
191
 On closer examination, however, the 
history is more mixed. 
The residual hearsay exception was not a creation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence; the exception existed at common law. One of the leading cases 
applying the common-law residual exception was the 1961 decision Dallas 
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.
192
 In that case, when the 
county courthouse collapsed, the county filed suit against its insurer 
alleging that a lightning strike—a risk covered by the defendant’s policy—
caused the collapse.
193
 At trial, the county introduced evidence that the 
debris contained charred timbers.
194
 In defense, the insurer contended that 
the collapse was caused by the courthouse’s structural weakness—an 
excluded risk.
195
 To explain the presence of charred timbers, the insurer 
proffered a copy of an article in the June 9, 1901, issue of the Selma 
Morning Times, which contained an article describing a fire at the 
courthouse while it was under construction.
196
 The trial judge admitted the 
newspaper article over the county’s hearsay objection.
197
 
                                                                                                             
149, § 2:8, at 2-36–41 (rev. 2013). If it so happens that the act has led to a conviction that 
otherwise qualifies under Rule 609, the proponent can treat the act as evidence on the 
historical merits under Rule 404(b) and use the conviction as impeaching material under 
Rule 609.  
 191. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 192. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 193. Id. at 390. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 391. 
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The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Wisdom, upheld the 
trial judge’s ruling.
198
 Judge Wisdom stated that there is no legal “canon 
against the exercise of common sense in deciding the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence.”
199
 He characterized the hearsay in question as both 
reliable and necessary, and he found it “inconceivable . . . that a newspaper 
reporter in a small town would report there was a fire in the dome of the 
new courthouse—if there had been no fire. He [was] without motive to 
falsify, and a false report would have subjected . . . him to embarrassment 
in the community.”
200
 In addition, Judge Wisdom found that admitting 
hearsay evidence was necessary under these circumstances: Decades had 
elapsed since the 1901 fire, and it was highly unlikely that any witness with 
firsthand knowledge would be available.
201
 With Dallas County as a 




 approach to 
litigants’ requests that courts admit demonstrably trustworthy hearsay that 
did not fall within any recognized hearsay exception. 
When the Advisory Committee undertook to codify the common-law 
hearsay doctrine in Article VIII of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the question naturally arose as to whether the Rules should include a 
residual exception.
204
 The Advisory Committee’s initial 1969 draft included 
a residual exception,
205
 but one of the first organizations to respond to the 
release of the draft was the Committee of New York Trial Lawyers.
206
 
Although the Committee conceded that trial judges need some flexibility in 
                                                                                                             
 198. Id. at 397–98. 
 199. Id. at 397.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 396–97. 
 202. See Butler v. S. Pac. Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970) (“[E]vidence that is 
necessary to a proper consideration of the case and that exhibits an intrinsic probability of 
trustworthiness ought to be admissible under the liberal federal practice . . . .”) (citing Dallas 
County, 286 F.2d at 388). 
 203. See Walter Prince Rowe, Note, Evidence—Government Advisory Materials 
Exception to Hearsay Rule, 27 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1221 (1976) (explaining that “Dallas 
County established an approach to admissibility of evidence based not on rigid rules but 
rather upon a flexible standard resting on practical considerations”) (citing Dallas County, 
286 F.2d at 397); G.G.R., Comment, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169, 192 (1975).  
 204. See generally Imwinkelried, Scope of the Residual Hearsay, supra note 43.  
 205. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District 
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345, 377 (1969) (both 8-03 and 8-04 contained a 
generic residual exception).  
 206. See Jon R. Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exceptions: A New 
Day for “Great” Hearsay?, LITIG., Fall 1975, at 22, 22.  
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administering evidentiary rules, it believed that the residual exception 
accorded judges too much discretion; the Committee feared that such 
extensive discretion would make hearsay rulings too unpredictable.
207
 
Despite this criticism, the Advisory Committee decided to retain the 
exception in its 1971 draft.
208
 In its Note on Article VIII, the Committee 
stated that judges need the discretion conferred by the residual exception to 
deal with “presently unanticipated situations.”
209
 The Note specifically cited 
Dallas County as an example of how much discretion the provision was 
intended to accord trial judges.
210
 
After the Supreme Court approved the draft Rules in 1972 and submitted 
them to Congress, Congress intervened to prevent the Rules from taking 
effect.
211
 This was an unprecedented step because Congress had allowed the 
Court to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure 
without any congressional revision.
212
 Congress’s intervention created a 
veritable “crisis” in the rulemaking process, straining the relations between 
Congress and the federal courts.
213
  
The House was the first to take up the Rules. The House referred the 
Rules to the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Criminal Justice.
214
 
The Subcommittee prepared House Report 93-650, which recommended 
deleting the residual exception.
215
 The Report stated that draft Rule 102, 
which generally directed courts to construe the Rules to promote the 
ascertainment of truth and just outcomes,
216
 gave the trial judiciary 
adequate discretion. The Report added that a residual exception would 
                                                                                                             
 207. See id.  
 208. Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 422, 439 (1971). 
 209. Id. at 437. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7077 (1973).  
 212. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 244. The primary motivation 
for congressional action was the extensive backlash against draft Article V privileges.  
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE, supra note 6, at 244 (stating the draft privilege 
provisions proved to be “emotionally provocative”). 
 213. Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary 
Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675, 682–85 (1975). Congress had previously accorded the 
Court virtual autonomy in rulemaking.  
 214. KENNETH R. REDDEN & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
MANUAL 307 (1975).  
 215. Jon Waltz, Rule 803—Hearsay Exceptions: Availability of Declarants Immaterial, 
in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 13, 40 (PLI Criminal Law & Urban 
Problems Court Handbook Ser. No. 94, 1977).  
 216. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 7079 (1973).  
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inject “too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and [impair] the 
ability of practitioners to prepare for trial.”
217
 The full House eventually 
passed House Resolution 5463, approving a version of draft Rules but 
adopting the Subcommittee’s recommendation to omit any residual 
exception.
218
 If the legislative history of the issue ended here—if the Senate 
had simply endorsed the House position—the proponents of the “near miss” 
doctrine would have a much stronger case. Indeed, courts would not even 
need the “near miss” doctrine to cabin the residual exception because the 
residual hearsay exception would not exist. 
However, since Rule 807 is part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
Senate obviously did not wholeheartedly endorse the House position. 
Concededly, the Senate Report inveighs against giving trial judges “broad 
license”
219
 or “unbridled discretion.”
220
 However, after resorting to that 
rhetorical flourish to assuage the House, the Senate voted to reinstate a 
residual exception.
221
 The Report stated that without the benefit of a 
residual exception, trial judges might be tempted to “torture” the 
enumerated exceptions “beyond any reasonable circumstances which they 
were intended to include (even if broadly construed).”
222
 The Report 
asserted that its drafters believed that trial judges would “very rarely” 
employ the exception.
223
 However, like the Advisory Committee, the 
Senate Report cited the leading common-law decision, Dallas County as an 
“illustrat(ion)” of the discretion that trial judges would enjoy under the 
exception.
224
 The Senate voted to approve the draft Rules, including 
residual hearsay exceptions in Rules 803 and 804, in late 1974.
225
 
Since the House and Senate versions of the Rules differed, the matter 
went to Conference Committee. The Conference Committee was persuaded 
by the Senate Report.
226
 In one respect, the Committee revised the wording 
proposed by the Senate Report. At the urging of the District of Columbia 
Bar’s Committee with Respect to Article VIII,
227
 the United States 
                                                                                                             
 217. Id. 
 218. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7052 (1974). 
 219. Id. at 7066. 
 220. Id. at 7055. 
 221. Id. at 7066.  
 222. Id. at 7065. 
 223. Id. at 7066. 
 224. Id. at 7065. 
 225. The Senate Report is dated October 11, 1974. 
 226. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 7098–99 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). 
 227. Paul F. Rothstein, The Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 
GEO. L.J. 125, 157 n.167 (1973).  
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Congress Conference Committee added a pretrial notice requirement.
228
 
With that one exception, the Conference Committee members adopted the 
Senate position that there should be a residual exception and its proposed 




The Conference Committee then resubmitted the legislation to the House 
and Senate. During the House debate, Representative Elizabeth Holtzman—
who, as we shall soon see, played a role in the congressional deliberations 
over Rules 803(8)—voiced her opposition to the residual exception. She 
urged the House to reject the exceptions as unduly “casual [and] open-
ended.”
230
 However, over her opposition, both the House and the Senate 
voted to approve the Conference Committee version of the draft Rules. The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, including the two residual exceptions, took 
effect on July 1, 1975.
231
 
Eventually, the two residual hearsay exceptions were consolidated and 
moved to its current provision, Rule 807.
232
 In its current form, Rule 807 
requires the judge to determine whether the proffered hearsay possesses 
“circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” that are “equivalent” to 
hearsay admitted under the expressly enumerated exceptions.
233
 That 
language certainly requires the judge to compare the overall trustworthiness 
of the proffered hearsay to that of the general trustworthiness of hearsay 
received under the specific exceptions. However, as Part I explained, the 
“near miss” doctrine goes further; under this doctrine, the proffered hearsay 
is inadmissible as a matter of law even if it falls just short of satisfying a 
specific foundational requirement for the enumerated exception that the 
judge deems most apposite to the instant case. 
It is true that in both the House and Senate deliberations over the residual 
exceptions, some legislators voiced concern about the extent of judicial 
discretion under the exceptions, and some pleaded with Congress to omit 
any residual exceptions.
234
 However, when the dust settled, both the House 
and Senate had rejected those pleas.
235
 Moreover, both the Advisory 
                                                                                                             
 228. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 7105.  
 229. Id. at 7105–06. 
 230. 120 CONG. REC. 40891–93 (1974).  
 231. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.  
 232. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 233. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 234. See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra notes 219–29 and accompanying text. 
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 and the Senate Report
237
 pointed to the relatively liberal 
common-law decision in Dallas County as an example of how much 
discretion judges would wield under the statutes. Additionally, neither the 
Senate nor the Conference Committee Reports suggested that a judge 
should bar evidence under the residual exceptions merely on the ground 
that the proffered hearsay fell just short of satisfying the specific 
requirements of an enumerated hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804.  
In short, like the limitation that some courts have imposed on Rule 
608(b) evidence when there has been a conviction for an untruthful act, the 
“near miss” doctrine fails the standard set forth in Section II.B. The 
imposition of the Rule 609 restriction into Rule 608(b) is unsound because 
the legislative history does not prove the right type of intent; that is, to 
altogether block the admission of a certain type of evidence. Similarly, the 
“near miss” doctrine fails because a careful review of the residual 
exception’s legislative history does not establish that the drafters 
manifested an extraordinarily clear intent to narrow the discretion that 
judges possessed under progressive, common-law decisions such as Dallas 
County. 
C. Importing Restrictions from Federal Rule 803(8) into Rule 803(6) 
Part I pointed out that in United States v. Oates,
238
 a drug prosecution, 
the Second Circuit contemplated the interaction between the official record 
hearsay exception codified in Rule 803(8) and the business entry exception 
set out in Rule 803(6).
239
 The court decided to exclude a report by forensic 
chemists in the employ of the United States Customs Service.
240
 En route to 
its final decision, the court reached a number of intermediate conclusions: 
(1) the chemists were “law enforcement personnel” within the ambit of 
then-existing Rule 803(8)(B)’s exclusion of matters observed by such 
personnel;
241
 (2) the determination in the report that the substance analyzed 
was heroin was a “factual finding” under then-existing Rule 803(8)(C), 
which forbade the admission of such findings against a criminal accused;
242
 
and (3) there was a Congressional concern that the introduction of such 
reports would violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause 
                                                                                                             
 236. See FED. R. EVID. art. VII advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendment. 
 237. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 7065 (1974). 
 238. See United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977); see supra Part I.  
 239. Oates, 560 F.2d at 48, 68, 83–84. 
 240. Id. at 48–49. 
 241. Id. at 68. 
 242. Id. at 67, 84. 
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Oates has proven to be a controversial decision.
244
 For example, some 
courts have disagreed with Oates’ characterization of laboratory chemists 
as “law enforcement personnel.”
245
 These courts reason that an intolerable 
concern about law enforcement bias in the preparation of the report exists 
only when the hearsay writing is a document—such as an arrest report that 
is the product of a directly adversarial confrontation between the police and 
a citizen. Other courts have distinguished Oates. They contend that the 
Oates court overstated the constraints imposed by the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause.
246
 According to these courts, a declarant’s report 
should be admissible under Rule 803(6) at least when the declarant testifies 
and is subjected to cross-examination.
247
 If the purpose of the exclusion is 
to safeguard Confrontation Clause rights, but the declarant appears in court 
and permits confrontation, it does not serve the purpose of the exclusion to 
apply the rule; the declarant’s appearance as a witness satisfies the 
Confrontation Clause. 
However, those issues are not our present concern. Our focus is on a 
particular aspect of the Oates decision: the court’s conclusion that Congress 
had clearly manifested an intent that if a report was inadmissible under Rule 
803(8), the report could not be admitted under Rule 803(6). Oates’ detailed 
analysis of the legislative history presents a strong case for that proposition 
and, more to the point, makes out a persuasive case that satisfies the 
standard proposed at the end of Section II.B: an extraordinarily strong 
showing that Congress wanted to altogether bar a particular piece of 
evidence, not merely impose a restriction under Rule 803(8). 
                                                                                                             
 243. Id. at 64, 79. 
 244. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI, EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, ANDREA ROTH & JANE 
CAMPBELL MORIARTY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.02[c], at 379 (5th ed. 2012). 
 245. United States v. Wilmer, 799 F.2d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Gotti, 
641 F. Supp. 283, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing United States v. Yakobov, 712 F.2d 20, 25 
(2d Cir. 1983)); Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471, 481 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Michael 
H. Graham, Commentary, Business and Public Records Hearsay Exceptions, Fed. R. Evid. 
803(6) and (8); Multiple Level Hearsay, Fed. R. Evid. 805, 55 CRIM. L. BULL. 252, 269 
(2019). 
 246. United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 127 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 247. See United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980) (“Confrontation rights 
are not violated where the out-of-court declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination.”) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155–62 (1970)); United States v. 
Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1194 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., concurring).  
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Representative Elizabeth Holtzman played a central role in crafting the 
restrictions wrought into Rule 803(8).
248
 In Section III.B, we saw that she 
was on the losing side of the congressional debate over the residual hearsay 
exception. In contrast, on this issue, she was on the winning side. During 
the House deliberations over Rule 803(8), Representative David Dennis 
sponsored an amendment forbidding the receipt of reports reflecting 
“matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel” 
in criminal cases.
249
 He contended that this restriction was necessary to 
protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights,
250
 and 
Representative Holtzman spoke in support of his contention.
251
 Thus, two 
of the most vocal proponents of the restrictions both rested their argument 
on constitutional concerns that would arise regardless of whether the report 
was admitted as an official record or as a business entry. The majority of 
the House agreed and voted to include restrictive language in Rule 803(8). 
The Senate voted to approve a variation of the restriction but reworded 
the restriction to be inapplicable when “the author of the report was 
‘unavailable’ to testify.”
252
 As previously stated, the differing versions of 
the draft Federal Rules of Evidence—including the differing texts of Rule 
803(8)—necessitated a Conference Committee.
253
 While the Conference 
Committee sided with the Senate on the issue of the residual hearsay 
exceptions, the Committee came down on the side of the House for the Rule 
803(8) restrictions.
254
 After the conference, when Representative William 
Hungate, who was both the floor manager for the legislation and a member 
of the Conference Committee,
255
 was explaining the status of reports barred 
by the restrictions crafted into Rule 803(8), he flatly and bluntly said, “As 
the rules of evidence now stand, police and law enforcement reports are not 
admissible against defendants in criminal cases.”
256
 Representative Dennis, 
another floor manager for the legislation and Conference Committee 
member,
257
 expressed similar sentiments during the House deliberation on 
the final Conference version, which included the restriction he had 
sponsored. Commenting on the admissibility of a police report barred by his 
                                                                                                             
 248. Oates, 560 F.2d at 69. 
 249. Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 2387 (1984)). 
 250. Id. at 69. 
 251. Id.  
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 70. 
 255. Id. at 69. 
 256. Id. at 70 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. H12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)). 
 257. Id. at 71.  
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Rule 803(8) amendment, he broadly stated, “I cannot see how anybody 
could suggest that introducing such a report is possible or a thing that can 
be done under these rules.”
258
 Representative Dennis made that remark on 
the floor on the very day the House approved the Conference Committee 
version of the Federal Rules.
259
 As the Oates court noted, the revised 
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(8) echoed the concern voiced by 
these legislators.
260
 The Advisory Committee Note states that the rationale 
for the restriction on “findings” is that the “use [of such findings] against 
the accused in a criminal case” would result in an “almost certain collision 
with [Sixth Amendment] confrontation rights.”
261
 In summary, the 
Advisory Committee and leading figures in the congressional deliberations 
over Rule 803(8) made it abundantly clear that the drafters broadly intended 
to exclude a particular type of evidence, namely, law enforcement reports 
introduced against criminal defendants, on constitutional concerns that 
would be implicated regardless of whether the evidence was admitted under 
Rule 803(8) or Rule 803(6). 
The legislative history related to the Oates issue is readily 
distinguishable from the history pertinent to the “near miss” doctrine. The 
history most supportive of the “near miss” doctrine consists of statements 
by legislators who were on the losing side of the debate over the wisdom of 
including a residual exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, 
even accepting those legislators’ statements at face value, neither they nor 
any committee report stated that proffered hearsay should necessarily be 
excluded if the hearsay fell just short of satisfying the specific requirements 
of an enumerated exception. The Advisory Committee Note on the residual 
exception also does not contain such a statement.  
In sharp contrast, the extrinsic history most supportive of importing Rule 
803(8)’s restriction into Rule 803(6) consists of statements by legislators 
who were on the winning side of the debate over restricting the scope of 
Rule 803(8). Furthermore, on the face of the legislators’ statements, they 
argued broadly for completely excluding a particular kind of evidence, not 
merely imposing a restriction under Rule 803(8). Finally, as the Advisory 
Committee Note acknowledges, the winning legislators’ argument rested on 
a constitutional concern which would be present regardless of whether the 
court admitted hearsay evidence under Rule 803(8) or Rule 803(6). While 
the citation to Dallas County in the Advisory Committee Note on the 
                                                                                                             
 258. Id. at 72 (quoting 120 CONG. REC. H12254 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974)). 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. at 68–69.  
 261. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s notes to 1972 amendments. 
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residual exceptions weakens the case for the “near miss” doctrine, here the 
Note lends support to the decision to import the Rule 803(8) restriction into 
Rule 803(6).  
In sum, unlike the legislative history relevant to either the “near miss” 
doctrine or the doctrine importing Rule 609 restrictions into Rule 608(b), 
the history pertinent to the Oates issue passes muster under the test 
proposed at the end of Section II.B. Here, the extrinsic history contains a 
powerful showing of a broad legislative intent to bar a particular type of 
evidence, not a narrower intent to prescribe a restriction under a specific 
provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
IV. Conclusion 
It is understandable that there is a nostalgia for the common-law era of 
Evidence in the United States. From a commentator’s perspective, at 
common law it was exciting that it was possible for the commentator’s 
proposal to temporarily become law if the commentator’s writing could 
persuade one court—sometimes one judge—to embrace the view. From a 
judicial perspective, the advent of the Age of Statutes
262
 represented a shift 
in power from the courts to the legislatures. Because of this shift, a court 
might be tempted to reclaim some of that power by straining the meaning of 
a statute to reach what the court considered a desirable result.
263
 However, 
the separation of powers doctrine requires federal judges to make a 
conscious effort to resist that temptation because the amendment of statutes 
is a legislative function, not a judicial power.  
As we have seen, a court may legitimately rely on contextual 
interpretation to construe statutes. It is perfectly legitimate for a court to 
look to one statutory provision to eliminate an ambiguity in the wording of 
a separate, but related, provision. Thus, courts may consider conditional 
relevance under Rule 104(b) preliminary factfinding to interpret “probative 
value” in Rule 403 and determine whether that expression includes the 
credibility of the source of the evidence. Likewise, contextual interpretation 
allows courts to narrow the meaning of one provision if doing so is 
necessary to prevent the negation of another. Hence, courts may limit the 
scope of Rule 801(d)(2)(A) to preserve Rule 410’s blanket bar on the 
admission of testimony about nolo contendere pleas. 
                                                                                                             
 262. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 23. 
 263. See Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., California’s “Restatement” of Evidence: Some 
Reflections on Appellate Repair of the Codification Fiasco, 4 LOY. U. L. REV. 279 (1971).  
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However, without more—without an extraordinarily strong showing of a 
legislative intent to prevent the admission of a certain type of evidence—a 
court may not import a restriction from one Federal Rule of Evidence 
provision into another simply because the court believes that, as a matter of 
evidentiary policy, it would be wise to do so.
264
 Contextual interpretation 
does not warrant that outcome, and courts lack the authority to “improve” 
statutes on that basis
265
—especially when construing the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. In this setting, it is entirely appropriate to apply the interpretive 
presumption that the drafters’ omission is intentional if one provision is 
silent on a restriction expressly stated in another provision, particularly an 
adjacent one. As previously mentioned, all the Rules took effect 
simultaneously in 1975 after a long period of careful deliberation over the 
provisions’ wording by both the Advisory Committee and Congress. 
Worse still, the court’s imposition of uncodified restrictions runs counter 
to the basic thrust of the Federal Rules to liberalize admissibility 
standards,
266
 which is evident in many specific provisions in Articles IV–
X.
267
 More fundamentally, a bias in favor of admissibility is wrought into 
the trilogy of key relevance provisions at the very beginning of Article IV.  
                                                                                                             
 264. See Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 279 F. 
Supp. 3d 846 (D. Minn. 2017) (supplying an omission from a statute “transcends the judicial 
function”) (quoting Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113, 1118 (2016)); People v. 
Flores, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (noting that the court does not sit as 
a “super [l]egislature”) (citing Unzueta v. Ocean View Sch. Dist., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1992)); City of Susanville v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 721, 
729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“We are not at liberty, however, to rewrite a statute to comport 
with our notion of wisdom or common sense.”).  
 265. Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 794 F.3d 
383, 393 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”) (quoting 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)); In re Bracewell, 454 
F.3d 1234, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the Supreme Courts warning against “‘improving’ 
plain statutory language”); In re Baker, 430 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A] court’s role 
is to apply the legislature’s statutory scheme, not to improve upon it.”) (citing In re Platter, 
140 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 1998)); Muench Photography, Inc. v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 
Publ’g Co., 712 F. Supp. 2d 84, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The Court’s ‘task is to apply the text, 
not to improve upon it.’”) (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 126).  
 266. See generally Imwinkelried, Federal Rule of Evidence 402, supra note 8.  
 267. The Advisory Committee Notes to various Rules indicate that the drafters resolved a 
large number of common-law splits of authority in favor of adopting more liberal standards. 
For example:  
$ Rule 404(b) adopts the inclusionary view that the proponent of evidence of an 
uncharged crime may offer the evidence on any noncharacter theory of logical 
relevance. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Under the exclusionary conception that many 
courts followed at common law, there were a finite number of “exceptions” 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol72/iss2/2
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Rule 401 sets out an especially broad definition of “relevant” evidence—
namely, evidence pertaining to any “fact . . . of consequence.”
268
 The 
Advisory Committee Note expressly states that Rule 401 rejects the 
limitation, which some jurisdictions previously followed, that the fact in 
question had to be actively “disputed.”
269
  
As the Introduction to this Article noted, Rule 402 announces a general 
rule that relevant evidence is admissible unless it is excludable on one of 
the listed bases, such as the Constitution or statute.
270
 Again, Rule 402 
makes no mention of case or decisional law. As a witness predicted in the 
congressional hearings, the enactment of Rule 402 “will in all 
probability . . . prevent[]” the enforcement of uncodified evidentiary 
                                                                                                             
such as modus operandi and intent to a general rule of inadmissibility, and the 
evidence was admissible only if the proponent could fit his or her evidence into 
one of the pigeonhole exceptions. See also 1 IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED 
MISCONDUCT, supra note 149, § 2:37 (rev. 2013). 
$ Rule 703 allows an expert to base an opinion not only on personal knowledge 
and hypothetically assumed facts but also on secondhand, out-of-court reports 
if it is the reasonable practice of the expert’s specialty field to consider such 
reports. FED. R. EVID. 703. At common law, many courts restricted the expert 
to firsthand knowledge and hypothetically assumed facts when other witnesses 
supplied admissible testimony as to those facts. 
$ Rule 801(d)(2)(D) permits the introduction of vicarious admissions if, while 
the agency relationship exists, the party-opponent’s agent made a statement 
about the performance of his or her duties. Id. 801(d)(2)(D). At common law, 
many courts admitted only statements by spokesperson agents who were 
authorized to make statements on behalf of the principal. 
$ Rule 803(1) recognizes the present sense impression hearsay exception, which 
had been a distinct minority view at common law. Id. 803(1). 
$ Similarly, Rule 803(18) recognizes the learned treatise hearsay exception, 
another minority view at common law. Id. 803(18). 
$ Rule 901(b) made it clear that it treats many traditional common-law 
authentication techniques merely as “examples” of a broader, liberal standard 
set out in Rule 901(a): “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” 
Id. 901(a); see id. 901(b). 
$ Rule 1001(e) liberalized the admissibility of duplicates under the best evidence 
rule by defining duplicates broadly as “any counterpart produced by a 
mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process.” 
Id. 1001(e). The Rule dispenses with the common-law requirement that the 
duplicate be prepared at the same time as the original.  
 268. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 269. Id. 401 advisory committee’s notes to the 1972 proposed rules. 
 270. Id. 402. 
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 As the introduction noted, in two cases, the Supreme Court 
has recognized that this prediction has turned out to be true.
272
  
Finally, Rule 403 announces that while a judge may exclude relevant 
evidence on an ad hoc basis, due to its prejudicial character, the judge may 
do so only when the probative value of the evidence is “substantially 
outweighed” by such prejudice.
273
 Congress’s choice of the adverb 
“substantially” and the use of passive voice signaled its intent to place the 
burden—a heavy burden, in fact—on the party opposing the admission of 
logically relevant evidence.
274
 At common law, many courts had allocated 
that burden to the proponent of evidence. However, in the early House 
hearings on the then-proposed Federal Rules, Albert Jenner, chair of the 
Advisory Committee, stated that “the overall philosophy” of the Rules is to 
“place the burden upon he who seeks the exclusion of relevant evidence.”
275
 
In this light, the burden should unquestionably be on the opponent to 
establish that a provision contains an evidentiary restriction. Standing 
alone, the presence of a restriction in one Federal Rule provision does not 
empower the judge to import that restriction into a separate provision. If the 
opponent cannot persuade the judge that the restriction in the first provision 
helps clarify ambiguous language in the second provision, or that an 
absolute prohibition in the first necessitates a limiting construction of broad 
language in the second, importing a restriction is justifiable only when the 
                                                                                                             
 271. 22A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5199 n.22 (2019).  
 272. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1993) (“Nothing in the 
text of this Rule establishes ‘general acceptance’ [from Frye] as an absolute prerequisite to 
admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as 
a whole were intended to incorporate a ‘general acceptance’ standard.”); United States v. 
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 46–49 (1984) (“But the Rules do not by their terms deal with 
impeachment for ‘bias,’ although they do expressly treat impeachment by character evidence 
and conduct, Rule 608, by evidence of conviction of a crime, Rule 608, by evidence of 
conviction of a crime, Rule 609, and by showing of religious beliefs or opinion, Rule 610.”). 
 273. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 274. 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, FREDRIC I. 
LEDERER & LIESA RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 314, at 3-36–40 (6th ed. 
2016).  
 275. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The 
Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1465, 1478 (1985) 
(quoting Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal 
Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 77, 87 (1983)). When 
Rule 609 was amended in 1990, the accompanying Advisory Committee Note expressly 
stated that the burden is on the opponent. FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note on 
the 1990 amendments. 
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extrinsic legislative history very clearly establishes the sort of legislative 
intent described in Section II.B. 
The advent of the Age of Statutes has made statutory construction a more 
important component of judicial decision-making than ever before. Given 
the shift from cases to statutes, legislation has emerged as the dominant 
source of American law. In turn, the advent of textualism has caused 
another shift. Given the profound textualist skepticism of extrinsic 
legislative history materials,
276
 the priority in statutory construction has 
shifted from searching extrinsic history material to finding interpretive 
clues in the context of the same statutory scheme. As a result of this 
expanded role in statutory construction, the process of contextual 
interpretation deserves closer scrutiny. Contextual interpretation has limits 
as well as legitimate uses. It is true that no statute is an island unto itself 
and, thus, every statute has context.
277
 Each statute is distinct, and courts 
must respect the particular linguistic choices
278
 that the legislature opted to 
craft into the statute. This debate over contextual interpretation under the 
Federal Rules of Evidence is but a microcosm of the much larger debate 
over such interpretation in the Age of Statutes. Hopefully, this Article has 
made a small contribution to that debate by clarifying the uses and the 
limits of contextual interpretation in the particular setting of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 276. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–52 
(1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 362 (1990).  
 277. Even if the legislature enacts a single section into law, there will almost always be 
pre-existing statutes relating to the same general subject-matter. Consequently, those in pari 
materia statutes constitute context. 
 278. See cases cited supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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